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NUMBER I

In the continuing battle against environmental degradation, it is
crucial that the federal government work closely with the states to plan,
then imp!ement pollution abatement strategies. But despite the seriousness of the pollution problem, many states have balked at federallyimposed standards, proposals and deadlines. The author of this article
explores the history, nature and impact of the lack of cooperation that
has taken place in the case of transportation controls under the Clean
Air Act. He then goes on to discuss the techniques which constitutionally may, and may not, be used to force the states to comply with these
and similar federal mandates, and develops an analytical framework
based on a variety of recent cases which have affected the issue of
federalism.

TRANSPORTATION CONTROLS
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT--AN
EXPERIENCE IN (UN)COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM
Jackson B. Battle*
At the heart of the Clean Air Act' is a system called
"cooperative federalism," which has become the structural
principle for much of our most important national environCopyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming; B.A., 1968, Southern
Methodist University; J.D. with Honors, 1972, University of Texas; member
Texas and Wyoming Bars.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1977).
In this article, all references to sections in the Clean Air Act will be by
public law section numbers. The United States Code section numbers are
not used by practitioners in the field, and on the rare occasion when they
are used in a judicial opinion or article they cause only confusion. Therefore, the author confidently takes the liberty of not peppering this article
with cross references to the United States Code section numbers corresponding to his multitudinous citations to sections in the Clean Air Act. The
sections of the Act most often cited herein, however, do correspond recognizably with their U.S.C. counterparts: §§ 101-159 of the Act are §§ 74017459 of Title 42 U.S.C.; §§ 171-178 are §§ 7501-7508; §§ 301-316 are
§§ 7601-7616. Other sections do not correspond so well.
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mental legislation.! The basic scheme is creatively simple:
federal statutes and administrative rules establish the regulatory framework; states prepare and submit to the
responsible federal agency packages of state statutes and
regulations ("plans") designed to implement the federal
law; if a state plan is approved, the state assumes primary
implementation authority (usually with the aid of substantial federal funding); if a state does not submit an approvable plan, the federal agency remains in charge of
administering the act. In principle, cooperative federalism
is a marvelous device to accomplish comprehensive national
objectives without alienating and pre-empting the states
and expanding the federal bureaucracy to new dimensions
of size and unmanageability. Federal statutes and regulations establish the legal framework; but states are allowed
some discretion in applying this framework to their own
needs and policies, through the design particularities of
their plans as well as through their day-to-day decisions in
implementation and enforcement. The federal government
sets the stage and monitors the states' performances to
check failures and abuses,' but it largely avoids an intrusive
and costly federal presence.
The problem is that cooperative federalism does not
always work smoothly. The states don't always cooperate.
Why they don't depends upon what federal act and agency
is involved, the circumstances concerning individual states,
and with whom one talks. The federal statute may require
too much too soon.4 The responsible federal agency may go
even further.' There may be insufficient incentives to entice
the states to participate, as can occur when the state is left
.. 2. E.g., the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376;
the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-9; the Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464; the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328; the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987.
3. For example, by federal inspection and enforcement and by revocation
of approval of state programs. See §§ 308, 309(a)(1)-(2), and 402(c)
(3) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318, 1319
(a) (1)-(2), 1342(c) (3).
4. For example, the requirement in § 202(b) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 that ninety percent reductions in vehicle emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide be achieved by 1975 model year.
5. This is a widespread accusation levelled by the states at the Office of
Surface Mining for the regulations which it published implementing the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
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with too few discretionary choices.6 A state may be recalcitrant and not in agreement with national policy.7 Or
public attitudes reflected by the state may change before
the controlling federal legislation does.8
Whatever the cause for the breakdown in state/federal
cooperation, few legal problems would exist if the responsible
federal agency realistically were able to fall back on its
statutory duty to promulgate and administer a federal implementation plan. Under present interpretations of the
Constitution, the commerce clause is ample authority for
the federal government to directly regulate virtually any
threats to the environment anywhere within the countryat least as far as private activities are concerned.' The
obstacles to direct federal environmental regulation are
primarily practical and political ones, but they may be
insurmountable. Regulation of every source of air or water
pollution in any substantial part of the country would be
impossible without a quantum leap in the size of the federal
bureaucracy, a corresponding increase in federal agency
budgets," and duplication of many functions already performed by the states. It is not likely that Congress would
fund or long tolerate on any sizeable scale an agency's
making good the ultimate threat contained in such statutory schemes. The task of the federal government, therefore, becomes one of enticing or coercing the states to perform duties toward which they are themselves disinclinedwithout running afoul of constitutional restrictions or a
legislative backlash.
6. This is something which may have been partially responsible for the
states' initial lack of enthusiasm to obtain permitting authority under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
7. This can occur when rural states are subject to uniform national
policies or a valuable local industry is jeopardized.
8. For example, an "energy crisis" which shifts priorities toward increased
coal production might affect state willingness to submit to a stringent
federal statutory scheme.
9. See Katzenback v. MeClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298, 299-395 (1964); Wickard
v. Filburn. 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) ; United States v. Darby. 312 U.S.
100, 115, 122 (1941); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677
(1st Cir. 1974).
10. EPA's budget outlay for 1978 was over $5 billion, and it employed over
12,000 paid employees. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES, 263, 280 (1978).
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The history of transportation controls under the Clean
Air Act provides an excellent model for consideration of
the limits of various means available to obtain state
implementation of federal legislation. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) tested its power to compel state
implementation of the 1970 Amendments to the Act, but
largely failed in a series of cases first to be discussed in
this article. As a result, when Congress passed the 1977
Amendments to the Act it expressly created new "carrots
and sticks" to entice and coerce state cooperation. Exploration of the legal and practical obstacles to the use of these
persuasive devices is an ideal format for discussion of
"federalism" limits to this new regulatory approach, which
may yet hold more promise than any other for preserving
our nation's quality of life. Whether co-operative federalism succeeds or fails depends largely upon whether the law
is strong enough to keep its fabric intact. The author believes that traditional constitutional principles furnish sufficient authority to support adequate federal pressure
against uncooperative states. Congress is fully capable of
responding to protect the states when their integrity is
disregarded; and, in a rare case in which Congress does
not respond in time, recently rediscovered Tenth Amendment principles will prevent egregious federal disregard
of state sovereignty. Our experience to date with transportation controls bears out the author's confidence.
I.

A.

THE EXPERIENCE UNDER THE

1970

AMENDMENTS

Summary of the Relevant Statutory Provisions

In order to understand transportation controls and the
federalism problems that they have engendered, a basic
knowledge of the Clean Air Act is required. What follows
is an overview of the regulatory scheme existing under the
1970 Amendments. This is still the general format for the
Air Act, it is the stage on which the first legal battles were
fought, and present problems can be understood only in the
light of this recent history.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/1
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Congressional concern with the deteriorating quality
of the nation's air resulted in federal legislation in 1955,11
1960,1 1963,'" 1965,'" and 196715 which progressively increased the federal role, but which still left the states wide
latitude to set air quality standards and decide when they
would be met. Because of the states' disappointing response
to this gentle approach," Congress adopted a much more
forceful strategy in the comprehensive Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970. Although the 1970 Amendments continued to recite that "the prevention and control of air
pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States
and local governments," 7 new provisions were inserted to
insure that states met this responsibility and that EPA was
well equipped to remedy any shortcomings. Direct federal
regulatory authority was increased by requiring EPA to
promulgate uniform national standards of performance for
new stationary sources" and stringent national emission
standards for particularly hazardous air pollutants. 9 The
taproot of the 1970 Amendments, however, was (and is) the
national ambient air quality standards.
The Amendments required that within 30 days of
their enactment on December 31, 1970, the Administrator
of EPA was to publish proposed regulations prescribing
national "primary" and "secondary" ambient air quality
standards for each air pollutant for which "air quality
criteria" had been issued under the 1967 Act.'0 For these
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.

20.

69 Stat. 322-23.
74 Stat. 162.
The Clean Air Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 392-401.
The Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, 79 Stat. 992-96.
The Air Quality Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 485.
Brief histories of these early congressional efforts are contained in Train
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63-64 (1975), and
in Jorling, The Federal Law of Air Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1059-62 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
Clear Air Act § 101 (a) (3).
Clear Air Act § 111.
Clean Air Act § 112.
States were statutorily permitted to develop and submit to EPA
procedures for implementing and enforcing both new source standards and
hazardous pollutant standards. EPA was required to delegate such authority to any state whose procedures were adequate, retaining concurrent enforcement authority for itself. §§ 111(c), 112(d). States played
no part, however, in setting the actual standards. §§ 111(b), 112(b).
§ 109(a) (1) (A). This initial group of five "criteria" pollutants included
sulfur oxides
(SOJ), particulates, carbon monoxide (CO), photochemical
oxidants ( 0 ), and hydrocarbons (HC). To this list the Administrator
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"ambient pollutants" EPA was directed to promulgate such
primary and secondary standards within 90 more days.'
These national standards were timely promulgated on April
30, 1971.2 Primary standards were established at ambient"3
air concentration levels found "requisite to protect the public
health." 24 Secondary standards were set at ambient levels
"requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or
anticipated adverse effects. 25 Within nine months of EPA's
promptly added a sixth, nitrogen oxides (NO,). See 36 Fed. Reg. 22385
(1971).
No further addition was made until lead (Pb) was listed on March
31, 1976, as a result of a successful citizen suit. See Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 411 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd 545
F.2d 320 (2d. Cir. 1976).
21. Clean Air Act § 109(a) (1) (B).
22. 40 C.F.R. Part 50 (1971). The national ambient standards originally
promulgated were:
Federal Standard
Substance

Primary

Secondary

60 microgm/m3 [0.02 p.p.m.]
annual arithmetic mean
260 microgm/ma [0.1 p.p.m.]
maximum in 24 hours
1,300 microgm/m3 [0.5 p.p.m.]
maximum in 3 hours
60 microgm/ms
75 microgm/ms
Particulates
annual geometric mean
annual geometric mean
150 microgm/ma
260 microgm/ms
maximum in 24 hours
maximum in 24 hours
10 milligm/ma [9 p.p.m.]
10 milligm/ma [9 p.p.m.]
CO
maximum in 8 hours
maximum in 8 hours
40 milligm/ma [35 p.p.m.]
40 milligm/m3 [35 p.p.m.]
maximum in 1 hour
maximum in 1 hour
Photochemical 160 microgrn/m3 [0.08 p.p.m.] 160 microgm/m3 [0.08 p.p.m.]
maximum in 1 hour
maximum in 1 hour
Oxidants
HC (corrected 160 microgm/ma [0.24 p.p.m.] 160 microgm/ma [0.24 p.p.m.]
maximum in 3 hours,
maximum in 3 hours,
for methane)
6 a.m.-9 a.m.
6 a.m.-9 a.m.
100 microgm/ma [0.05 p.p.m.] 100 microgm/ma [0.05 p.p.m.]
NO,
annual arithmetic mean
annual arithmetic mean
Maximum concentrations are not to be exceeded more than once per year.
P.p.m. means parts per million.
The secondary standard for SO 2 was relaxed in 1973 by withdrawal
of the annual and 24-hourly measurements. 38 Fed. Reg. 25678 (1973).
On October 5, 1978, national primary and secondary standards for
lead were promulgated at a single level of 1.5 micrograms/ms, maximum
arithmetic mean averaged over a calendar quarter. 43 Fed. Reg. 46258
(1978).
On February 8, 1979, EPA changed the chemical designation of photoand revised both the primary
chemical oxidants to simply "ozone" (O)
and secondary standards up to 0.12 p.p.m. (235 micrograms/m), with
attainment to be determined by a new complex formula. 44 Fed. Reg. 8220
(1979).
"Ambient air" is "that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings,
to which the general public has access." 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (1978).
Clean Air Act § 109(b) (1).
Clean Air Act § 109(b) (2).
so 2

80 microgm/m' [0.03 p.p.m.]
annual arithmetic mean
365 microgm/m3 [0.14 p.p.m.]
maximum in 24 hours
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promulgation of these standards, each state was required
by Section 110(a) (1) of the Act to adopt and submit to
EPA a plan which provided for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the standards within each air
quality control region 2 inside the state's boundaries. Within
four months after submission of each state implementation
plan ("SIP"), EPA was directed to approve or disapprove
the plan, in whole or in part. 7 Approval was required if the
SIP satisfied eight general conditions, the first of which
was that the plan provide for attainment of the primary
standards within the state "as expeditiously as practicable
but . . . in no case later than three years from the date of
approval of such plan," and attainment of the secondary
standards within "a reasonable time."28 Another basic requirement for approval of a SIP was that it include
"emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance . .. , and such other measures as may be necessary
to insure attainment. . ., including. . . land use and transportation controls." 9 If these and the other six conditions
designed to assure adequate implementation were met, EPA
was required to approve the state-submitted SIP. In the
event of disapproval of all or a portion of the SIP, or the
failure of a state to submit a plan, EPA was required to
promulgate a federal "substitute" implementation plan designed to correct any state omissions or deficiencies and
achieve attainment by the same means available to the
states.3"
Once a plan was approved and/or promulgated, the
state had primary responsibility to administer and enforce
its provisions: for example, by requiring permits contain26. "Air quality control regions" are purely fictitious geographic entities whose
designation was mandated by the 1967 Act, and expanded by the 1970
Amendments, for the purpose of defining atmospheric areas with common
pollution problems and political factors. See Clean Air Act § 107. There are
about 250 such designated regions at present. See 43 Fed. Reg. 9058-59
(1978). They are intended to be a group of communities that should be
treated as a unit for purposes of setting and implementing air quality
standards. Their function, however, is more structural than substantive,
and their existence may cause more confusion than organization. See
W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 211-12, 222 (1977).
27. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2).
28. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (A).
29. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (2) (B).
30. Clean Air Act § 110(c).
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ing numerical emission limitations for stationary sources,
and by prosecuting such sources if they operated without
a permit or in violation of the terms of their permits. EPA
was to stand in a backup capacity. According to Section
113(a), EPA was to take enforcement action against any
person in violation of any requirement of a plan, (1) if
the state failed to remedy the violation after 30-days'
notice, or (2) during any period in which EPA had assumed
enforcement duties because of the state's failure to enforce
the plan effectively despite widespread violations. As a final
device to encourage enforcement, Section 304 allowed
citizens to initiate civil actions in federal court if both the
affected state and EPA failed to discharge their enforcement obligations."
Although states were hardpressed to meet their January 31, 1972 deadlines for SIP submittal, and EPA fell
behind the statutory schedule for approving or promulgating implementation plans, the greatest problems were
not with what control measures were necessary for stationary sources. Of course, stationary sources did experience
some difficulties. The Supreme Court told them that economic and technological infeasibility did not require relaxation of emission limitations contained in an SIP. 2 Indeed,
infeasibility for the sources would not justify a state's submitting a plan not designed for attainment of the primary
ambient standards within three years. Therefore, unless
states were farsighted and able to obtain "extensions" for
up to two additional years under Section 110 (e),"3 stationary
sources faced compliance deadlines in mid-1975 (typically
May 31, 1975), whether feasible or not. The "technologyforcing" emission limitations and the mandatory compliance
deadlines caused many stationary sources no little anguish;
but, in the main, states recognized what sorts of emission
limitations were necessary for them and, however reluc31. Clean Air Act § 304 also provided for citizen suits to compel the Administrator to perform any non-discretionary act. Clean Air Act § 304(a) (2).
32. See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
33. By satisfying even more stringent requirements in Clean Air Act § 110(f),
a state could also obtain a one-year "postponement" for an essential
stationary source. See discussion of Clean Air Act §§ 110(e) and (f), in
their form under the 1970 Amendments, in Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75-87 (1975).
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tantly, did eventually incorporate such controls into their
SIPs. State cooperation proved to be much harder to obtain
for control of vehicle emissions.
Vehicle emissions are the major source of four of the
six pollutants for which ambient air standards were originally issued. 4 Carbon Monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC),
and nitrogen oxides (NO.) are the major pollutants emitted from vehicle tailpipes;" and HC and NO. combine with
atmospheric oxygen in sunlight in complex chemical reactions to form photochemical oxidants, or "brown smog.""
Section 202 of the Air Act was designed to deal directly
with tailpipe emissions of these "vehicle pollutants." Section
202(a) directed EPA to set emission standards for new
vehicles to protect public health and welfare, but to take
account of economic and technological feasibility in doing
so. Pursuant to Section 202(b) these "feasibility-based"
standards were to be replaced in 1975 and 1976 model years
by statutorily mandated levels. Ninety percent reductions
from 1970 (for CO and HC) and 1971 (for NO.) modelyear emissions were required for 1975 and 1976 models,
resulting in standards of .41 grams per vehicle mile (gpm)
HC and 3.4 gpm CO for 1975 models and 0.4 gpm NO.
for 1976 models. Whether or not these statutory standards
might have eased significantly the attainment burden, they
were not destined to take effect on schedule. A series of
actions by EPA and Congress have repeatedly extended the
deadlines and relaxed the standards, until now the .41 gpm
HC standard is slated for the 1980 model year, the 3.4 gpm
CO standard for 1981, and a 1.0 NO. standard for 1981.T
34. See EPA's general preamble to all original transportation control plans,
38 Fed. Reg. 30626 (1973). 50% to 80% urban air pollution has been
attributed to vehicle emissions of CO. HC, NO,, lead, and particulate
matter. Scheiderman, Cohn, & Paulsen, Air Pollution and Urban Freeways:
Making a Record on Hazards to Health and Property, 20 CATiE. U. L.
REV., 5 (1970).
35. Along with lead. See notes 20 and 22 supra.
36. The most readily measured photochemical oxidant is ozone, which is
accepted as a reliable indicator of overall oxidant pollution. See note 22
supra.
37. The original 1975 model-year statutory deadline for HC and CO was
extended for one year by EPA, delayed a second year by the Energy
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 (ESECA) (15 U.S.C.
§§ 791-798), and extended a third year by EPA-putting the standards
on line for the 1978 model year. ESECA also extended the NO, standard
until 1978 models. The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, however,
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Control of tailpipe emissions was aided by EPA's authority
under Section 211 to regulate fuel and fuel additives if
burning the fuel would (a) produce emissions which endanger public health or welfare or (b) impair the performance of emission control equipment. Under the first
authority, EPA promulgated regulations requiring the
phase-down of the average lead content of gasoline."
Under the latter authority it required gasoline refiners to
market at least one line of the lead-free gasoline necessary
for catalytic converters." The federal regulation both of
vehicle emissions under Section 202 and of fuels under
Section 211 are largely pre-emptive of such regulation by
the states.4"
B.

Breakdown in the Cooperative Model and EPA's Response

The situation facing many states when their SIPS
were due4 was not a happy one. Most large urban areas
were not in attainment for the "vehicle pollutants." 2 Control of emissions from stationary sources would not alone
be sufficient for attainment." Except for California, states
were preempted from directly regulating the tailpipe emissions from new vehicles. And the federal new-car tailpipe
standards, even before they were relaxed, would not bring

38.

39.
40.
41.
42.

43.

again rescued Detroit, giving it at least until 1980 and 1981 model years
to stringently control tailpipe emissions. See Comment, The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977: Expedient Revisions, Noteworthy New Provisions,
7 ENVIR. L. REP. 10182 (1977).
On November 28, 1973. See 38 Fed. Reg. 33741 (1973), 40 C.F.R. § 80.20
(a) (1) (ii) (1979). These "low-lead" regulations survived attack by manufacturers of lead additives and gasoline refiners in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
After July 1, 1974. See 38 Fed. Reg. 1254 (1973); 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.2(g),
80.24, 80.5, 80.22 (1973). These "no-lead" regulations were sustained for
the most part in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (1974).
Federal pre-emption of setting emission standards for new motor vehicles
is expressed in Clean Air Act § 209. Pre-emption of control over fuels
and fuel additives is stated in § 211 (c) (4).
By statute, January 31, 1972.
It was later determined that during 1971 and 1972 the oxidant standard
was exceeded in 54 air quality control regions; the carbon monoxide
standard in 29. Taken together, in 66 regions, containing roughly 60 percent
of the nation's population, one or both of these primary standards were
violated. See W. Horowitz & S. Kuhotz, Transportation Controls to Reduce
Automobile Use and Improve Air Quality in Cities: The Need, the Options
and Effects on Urban Activity, EPA Report, Nov., 1974, at 1.
See the 1973 "general preamble" to EPA's transportation control plans, 08
Fed. Reg. at 30626.
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attainment in the near future." The enumeration in
Section 110(a) (2) of the requirements for an approvable
SIP, however, provided direction for the states. Section
110(a) (2) (B) specifically required, in addition to stationary source emission limitations, "such other measures
as may be necessary..., including.., land-use and transportation controls."" Section 110 (a) (2) (G) required the
SIP to provide "to the extent necessary and practicable, for
periodic inspection and testing of motor vehicles to enforce
compliance with applicable emission standards.""0
Because of the perceived unpopularity of such efforts
to come between the average American and his automobile,
and the states' lack of familiarity with transportation control planning, most failed to include in their first proposed plans any significant transportation control strategies, concentrating almost exclusively - and, therefore,
on emissions from stationary sources.
inadequately However, when the EPA Administrator promulgated his
approvals/disapprovals of the original SIPs on May 31,
1972, he stated that the deadline for submittal of the
44. Indeed, in EPA's general preamble it stated that in a number of areas
"emission controls on automobiles alone will never be adequate." Id. at
30628. Studies conducted in 1974 predicted that the more stringent statutory tailpipe standards would bring about attainment in nearly twothirds of the problem regions. See RODGERS, supra note 26, at 312. By 1976,
however, the new-car tailpipe standards had achieved only modest success.
See H. R. REP. No. 94-1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 189-90 (1976). In part,
this limited success was due to the repeated statutory and administrative
extensions of the original deadlines under Clean Air Act § 202(b). See
note 37 supra.
45. EPA defines "transportation control measure" to mean: "any measure
such as reducing vehicle use, changing traffic flow patterns, decreasing
emissions from individual motor vehicles, or altering existing model split
patterns that is directed toward reducing emissions of air pollutants from
transportation sources." 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(r) (1978). More generally,
transportation control include any method of reducing emissions from
existing (as opposed to new) vehicles, discouraging automobile use, and
encouraging the use of cleaner means of transportation (such as mass
transit). A partial list of various transportation control measures available is contained in § 108(f) (1) (A) of the Clean Air Act.
46. Vehicle emission control inspection and maintenance programs ("VIM")
are included within the general category of transportation controls. See
note 45 supra. More specifically, the term is defined as "a program to
reduce emissions from in-use vehicles through identifying vehicles which
need emission control-related maintenance and requiring that maintenance
be performed." 40 C.F.R. § 52.242(a) (1) (1978).
For some purposes, EPA treats VIM as not within its reference to
"transportation control measures." See 44 Fed. Reg. 20372, 20377 (1979),
and notes 156 and 157 and accompanying text infra. In this article, unless
a distinction is indicated, the term "transportation control measure" (or
"strategy") will include VIM.
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transportation control portions of SIPs would be extended
to February 15, 1973. In the same ruling, the Administrator
also granted blanket two-year extensions of the attainment
date, until mid-1977, to the 21 states for whom transportation controls would be necessary.47 On January 31, 1973,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that both the extension of the
submittal deadline and the blanket extension of the attainment date were not authorized by the Clean Air Act.4"
Thus, pursuant to court order, EPA promptly rescinded the
extensions and notified the states that their SIPS, complete
with any necessary transportation controls, had to be submitted by April 15, 1973.
The states responded with varying degrees of good
faith, effort, and timeliness. By June 15, 1973, sixteen
states had submitted transportation control plans. On that
date EPA announced its approval/disapproval decisions,
complete with detailed evaluations and specification of
deficiencies. After the states were given the opportunity to
cure deficiencies, EPA, acting pursuant to its Section 110 (c)
duty, published proposed "substitute" plans and scheduled
the necessary public hearings thereon. On November 6, 1973,
EPA issued the first of its substitute plans along with a
"general preamble" to all plans to be promulgated." By
December 6, 1973, EPA had completed its task of promulgating transportation control plans for all states where
they were necessary." Concurrently with promulgation of
the various transportation control plans, EPA granted extensions of attainment dates, on a region-by-region basis,
for up to two years (e.g., until May 31, 1977) for the
vehicle pollutants based upon individual showings of "necessity" meeting the requirements of Section 110(e).
In the preamble to its substitute plans EPA enumerated
and discussed the transportation control measures which it
47.

37 Fed. Reg. 10842 (1972).

48. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
49. This general preamble, published at 38 Fed. Reg. 30626 (1973), contains
the early history of EPA's promulgation of transportation controls which
is summarized above.
50. These plans, in all their combinations and varieties, are collected at 40
C.F.R. Part 52 (1974).
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was, in varying degrees, imposing on the states. In general,
these controls were designed either to reduce vehicle miles
traveled (VMT) or to reduce emissions from vehicles once
they were on the roads. In the first category was included:
(1) limitations on both on and off-street parking;51 (2)
imposition of parking fees and other charges to finance
mass transit; (3) establishment of carpool programs; (4)
creation of preferential bus and/or carpool lanes; (5) purchase of buses for expanded mass transit systems; (6) creation of bikeway networks; (7) time and place restrictions
on the use of heavy-duty and commercial vehicles; (8)
establishment of "vehicle free zones;" and (9) limitations
on the supply of gasoline. In the second category, that of
measures designed to reduce tailpipe emissions from existing vehicles, EPA included vehicle inspection and maintenance programs (VIM) and requirements for "retrofitting" vehicles with added pollution control devices. Equipment required to be included in state retrofit programs
ranged from "vacuum spark advance disconnect systems"
and air/fuel control devices for pre-1968 vehicles to catalytic converters (costing up to $300 per installation) for
all vehicles to which they would be compatible. VIM programs were at the heart of most transportation control
plans promulgated by EPA. Essentially, EPA directed
states to require all vehicles in an area to be tested annually
for emissions and to prohibit those vehicles which exceeded
certain emission levels from operating on the state's streets
and highways.
Understand that EPA was not proposing to establish
and administer these retrofit and VIM programs itself, nor
51.

Off-street parking controls included both "parking surcharges" (taxes or
fees imposed on parking spaces) and regulations for the "management
of parking supply" (requiring a permit or prior approval for new parking
lots, the issuance and terms of which are based on air quality considerations). Neither of these strategies was destined to endure. In the Energy
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Congress prohibited
EPA from promulgating or requiring state submittal of plans contain
parking surcharges and voided all such existing EPA requirements. ESECA
also authorized EPA to temporarily suspend its regulations for management of parking supply-which EPA did. When Congress subsequently
denied it funds to administer parking management, EPA suspended all
such regulations indefinitely. See 40 Fed. Reg. 2585, 28064, 29713 (1975).
The relevant portions of ESECA are incorporated as amendments to the
Clean Air Act, § 110(c) (2).
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was it proposing to create the bus lanes and bikeways,
purchase the buses and manage transit systems, or establish and run other ingredients in a transportation control plan. EPA's substitute plans required the states to
do all this - specifically including the enactment of necessary state and/or local statutes and regulations, the creation of agencies to administer these programs, the enforcement of such laws against their citizens, and the expenditure of state and local revenue (although aided by federal
funding). EPA's rationale for this position was expressed
in its "preamble" of November 6, 1973.2 From Congress'
statements that the states had the primary responsibility
for achieving and maintaining air quality standards, 3
EPA inferred the legislative intent that states could be
compelled to discharge this responsibility. EPA was more
convincing when it pointed out the practical necessity for
this approach: this air pollution was generated by millions
of individual vehicles operating on an extensive network
of public roads; direct federal enforcement would involve
massive and duplicative federal programs that would put
"about everybody on the payroll of the United States";"4
therefore, if the states were not forced to do it, it would
not be done.
Turning to specific provisions in the Act, EPA found
support in Section 113 (a)'s directive for the Administrator
to take enforcement action whenever "any person is in
violation of any requirement of an applicable implementation plan." Section 302(e) defines "person" to include a
"state, municipality, and political subdivision of a State."
To EPA this indicated that a state, like any other person,
could be subjected to federally-promulgated requirements
governing operation of both its "direct" and "indirect"
sources55 of air pollution and that, in the same vein, federal
52.
53.
54.
55.

See 38 Fed. Reg. at 30632-33.
See Clean Air Act §§ 101(a) (3), 107(a).
38 Fed. Reg. at 30633.
In its general preamble EPA explained the term "indirect source" as
follows:
Many such facilities may also be viewed as indirect sources
of air pollution. An indirect source is one that encourages mobile
source pollution at locations not necessarily coincident with the
source itself by serving as a trip attraction for automobile drivers
or which provides a parking or driving convenience. Thus, the
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enforcement action could be brought against it for failure
to obey any such requirements. Certainly a state-owned
direct source, such as a municipal incinerator, could be
subjected to federal emission limitations and to enforcement
action for failing to abide by them. Therefore, EPA reasoned, a state-owned and administered indirect source, such
as a highway or parking space, could likewise be subjected
to federal regulation and enforcement." Treating state
and local transportation systems as indirect sources, EPA
next proceeded to justify the two general types of requirements which it would impose upon their operation. First,
it would require that they only be operated in certain ways
e.g., with bus and carpool lanes, more buses, bike lanes,
fewer parking spaces, etc. Second, it would require that
"the road owners and the licensing and regulating authorities" regulate the emissions of those who used them - by
establishing and administering VIM and retrofit programs.
Failure to meet these requirements, including the failure
to regulate pursuant to the federal plan, would subject the
states and their officials to the sanctions available under
Section 113: administrative compliance orders, court injunctions, steep civil penalties; and, perhaps, even steeper
criminal fines and imprisonment.
EPA went so far as to require, on pain of these enforcement sanctions, that states conduct studies necessary to
formulate the proper statutes and administrative rules,
that such proposed legislation and regulations be submitted
to EPA for its approval, and that evidence of commitment
of adequate state funds be produced.5" Predictably, the states
availability of ample low-cost parking facilities and high-speed
freeways influences individuals to use vehicles with as few as one
person in them, rather than less-polluting modes of transit. Such
facilities may legitimately be charged not only with the pollution
arising directly from their premises, but also with the total pollution in the region emitted by the traffic increase which they
encourage.
38 Fed. Reg. at 30632-33.
The present agency definition is at 40 C.F.R. § 52.22(b) (i) (1978).
56. In support of this contention EPA pointed out that by building highways,
licensing vehicles and operators, providing a system of traffic laws, etc.,
government had encouraged the growth of automobile use to its existing
levels. 38 Fed. Reg. at 30632.
57. See, for example, the following requirements in the plan promulgated for
California: 40 C.F.R. § 52.242(c), (f) (that the state submit legally
adopted regulations establishing VIM and that it identify the source and
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to whom such EPA-promulgated plans applied balked, few
cooperated, and several challenged the plans and their enforcability by petitioning for judicial review in the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals. Basically these judicial
challenges were on two grounds: first, that such plans
and sanctions were not authorized by the Clean Air Act;
and, second, that they were in violation of constitutional
principles of federalism, embodied primarily in the Tenth
Amendment.
C.

Judicial Reaction to EPA's Approach
The only Court of Appeals of the four who heard such
challenges to accept EPA's argument on both counts was
the Third Circuit, the first to decide the issues. In Pennsylvania v. EPA5" the court agreed with EPA's finding of statutory authority in Section 113 (a) (1) and cited Maryland
v. Wirtz 9 for the proposition that "the constitutionality of
federal regulation of state activities is subject to the same
analysis as that of private activities; viz. the determinative
factor is simply whether they have an impact on interstate
commerce." ' After so holding, the Third Circuit had no
problem finding that state transportation systems and
vehicle pollution had the requisite effects on interstate
commerce.
The Ninth Circuit was not so receptive to EPA's position. In Brown v. EPA"' ("Brown I") it reviewed the

58.
59.

60.
61.

amount of funds necessary for the program); 40 C.F.R. § 52.244 (that
the state submit legally adopted regulations establishing a retrofit program) ; 40 C.F.R. § 52.257 (that it do the same in the case of a computer
carpool matching program).
See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.476(g), 52.1080(g), 52.2435(e) (requiring
the District of Columbia, and the States of Maryland and Virginia to
submit statements evidencing financial committments adequate to purchase
475 new buses over a three-year period).
Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d. Cir. 1974).
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In Wirtz the Supreme Court
had upheld against a constitutional attack the application of federal wage
and hour law to employees at state-operated schools and hospitals, stating:
But while the commerce power has limits, valid general regulations of commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce
because a State is involved: If a State is engaging in economic
activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government
when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced
to conform its activities to federal regulation.
392 U.S. at 196-97.
Pennsylvania v. EPA, supra note 58, at 261.
Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977),
af 'd, 566 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977).
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numerous elements of EPA's extensive transportation control plan for all of California's air quality control regions "
and barred any imposition of sanctions against the state
for its failure to comply with virtually any part of the plan.
Strongly influenced by the serious constitutional issues at
stake, the court was unwilling to accept the agency's interpretation of Section 113. Specifically, it rejected a construction which would authorize sanctions against the state
for its failure to comply with federal regulations requiring
it to control the pollution-creating activities of those other
than itself: "Tersely put, the Act . . . permits sanctions
against a state that pollutes the air, but not against a state
that chooses not to govern polluters as the Administrator
directs.""8 In explaining its view of the fundamental constitutional questions raised by EPA's position, the court
indulged in dicta leaving little doubt of its position. It
forcefully stated its opinion that the commerce power did
not extend to requiring a state to govern, pursuant to federal
directives, private activities affecting commerce. It saw a
significant difference between a state's engaging in commerce and a state's regulation of the commerce of others.
In this manner it distinguished Wirtz and the more recent
decision of Fry v. United States,6" in which the Supreme
Court had upheld application of the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970 to temporarily freeze the wages of state and
local employees. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit prophetically
supported its constitutional analysis with a quotation from
a footnote in the Fry opinion: "The [Tenth] Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress
may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system6 5 Such a danger was found by the Court in EPA's
approach to transportation controls.
With the same constitutional reservations, and employing similar reasoning, the Fourth Circuit found in62. Which included VIM and retrofit programs, preferential bus and carpool
lanes, computer carpool matching systems, parking surcharges and management regulations, mass transit planning, limitations on gasoline supply,
and quite a few other strategies. See 40 C.F.R. 52.220-52.266 (1974).
63. Brown v. EPA, supra note 61, at 832.
64. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
65. Id. at 547 n. 7, quoted in Brown I, supra note 61, at 842.
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adequate statutory support for EPA's construction of Section 113(a) (1) and thereby pulled the teeth in its transportation control plan for Baltimore. The Administrator
fared somewhat better, however, in the D.C. Circuit. In
District of Columbia v. Train, 7 responding to challenges to
EPA's transportation control plan for the National Capital
Interstate Region, the court saw much the same distinction
as did the Ninth Circuit between imposing federal sanctions
for a state's creation of pollution and imposing federal
sanctions for a state's failure to control pollution from
private sources - the former being comprehended by Section 113 (a) (1) and constitutional, the latter not being
authorized by Section 113 (a) (1) and unconstitutional. The
difference was in the two courts' dissimilar classifications
of the various elements of the plans. Like the Ninth Circuit,
the D.C. Circuit held that EPA could not, under the Air
Act or the Tenth Amendment, require states to adopt
statutes and regulations necessary to establish VIM and
retrofit programs." The D.C. Circuit decided, however, that
both Section 113 and the Constitution allowed EPA to treat
the states as violators for failing to manage their indirect
sources - i.e., their highways and other components in
their transportation systems - in a manner so as to encourage less vehicle use. Thus it upheld the bus purchase
and bus lane requirements as remedies for deficiencies
in the states' transportation systems. Such regulations of
the states' transportation systems the court found analogous
to the federal regulation of state-owned railroads approved
in United States v. California." The court did not feel that
such regulation of indirect sources constituted impairment
of the states' "integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system" in contravention of the Tenth
Amendment.
66. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated eub nom.
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
67. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub
nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977), reinstated in part and remanded
in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Costle, 567 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
68. The court did hold, however, that EPA could validly require a state not
to register or allow to operate on its streets or highways vehicles failing
to meet federal standards. Id. at 991-92.
69. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
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Soon after these Circuit Court cases were decided, the
Supreme Court breathed new life into the Tenth Amendment and Fry's footnote concerning state sovereignty. At7
issue in National League of Cities v. Usury ("NLC")
was the constitutionality of 1974 amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act which extended federal wage and hour
laws to cover almost all employees of state and local governments. The Court expressly overruled the eight-year-old
Wirtz decision to hold that congressional enactments such
as this, which are undoubtedly otherwise within the scope
of the commerce clause, encounter a constitutional barrier
erected by the Tenth Amendment when they are applied
to the states and their subdivisions in a manner which will
"operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions."'" In concluding that the application of federal
wage and hour laws to the states would have such an unconstitutional effect, the Court accepted the states' argument that, by increasing costs, the law would force state
and local governments to make significant compromises in
structuring their delivery of governmental services, such as
police and fire protection, and could cause complete abandonment of certain programs, such as training programs dependent upon paying below minimum wage. This the court
held to constitute impermissable interference with integral
governmental functions. The opinion, however, contained
several qualifications. First, Fry, was distinguished through
a balancing process. The Court viewed the temporary
freeze on the wages of state employees as an "emergency
measure" to relieve "an extremely serious problem" (inflation) for a "limitd, specific period of time." The Court
also said that the wage freeze in Fry interfered with no
state choices on the structure of governmental operations
and noted that it reduced the pressures upon state budgets
rather than increased them." Second, the holding in United
States v. California was treated as consistent with this decision, in that a state's operation of a railroad was not re70. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
71. Id. at 852.
72. Id. at 852-53.
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garded as an integral part of its governmental activities.73
Third, the Court disavowed that the decision carried any
implication as to the constitutionality of affecting such integral state operations through use of the federal spending
power. 4 Also, the court held that pre-emption of state law
by the furtherest extension of federal authority was fully
consistent with the opinion." Predictability of the decision's
effect on transportation control cases was further diminished
by Justice Blackmun's swing vote, coming in a concurring
opinion which interpreted the Court's opinion as a "balancing approach" which "does not outlaw federal power in areas
such as environmental protection, where the federal interest
is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance
with imposed federal standards would be essential.""
NLC, of course, did little for EPA's confidence in the
future of its approach to transportation controls. Its petitions for certiorari from the decisions of the Ninth, Fourth,
and D.C. Circuits, which the Supreme Court granted, were
limited to challenging only the courts' invalidation of the
VIM programs. The Court also granted Virginia's petition
for review of the D.C. Circuit's upholding of the bus purchase
and bus lane requirements and its approval of the prohibition against registering non-conforming vehicles. Thus,
EPA v. Brown" came before the Court. But at oral argument the government informed the Court that it was repealing its bus purchase regulations. The case shrank even
further when the Court construed a footnote in the government's brief to mean that EPA would not require the enactment of state legislation and that it conceded the necessity
of removing from its regulations any requirement that the
7
states promulgate regulations.
With the case in this posture, the Supreme Court refused to pass upon EPA's regulations before they were in fact changed and, as modified, reviewed in the lower courts. It therefore, vacated the de73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 854 n. 18.
Id. at 852 n. 17.
Id. at 844-45.
Id. at 856.
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
EPA had earlier abandoned its parking surcharge regulations and regulations for the management of parking supply. See note 51 supra.
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cisions below and remanded the cases to the Courts of Appeals.
Before these cases were reconsidered in the Courts of
Appeals, the Air Act underwent significant changes in the
extensive amendments of August 2, 1977."9 Therefore, although the D.C. Circuit" reaffirmed its original holdings
on the retrofit, bike lane, and bus lane regulations, it remanded these portions of the case back to EPA for reconsideration in light of the 1977 Amendments. As to the VIM
regulations, because by this time EPA had promulgated the
promised modifications, the court remanded this aspect of
the case back to the agency in order to permit administrative
remedies to be pursued prior to its review.
In the Ninth Circuit's decision on remand,81 EPA's modified VIM regulations were reviewed, but with no change
in the court's opinion. The changes which EPA had promised
in order to eliminate any requirement for state promulgation of regulations or reference to state legislation seemed to
be little more than cosmetic. It had simply changed a few
words in its original VIM regulations so that, although the
state was no longer required to submit to EPA an advance
text of its implementing laws and regulations, it was still
requiring to create and administer a VIM program that
complied with EPA's guidelines. This the Ninth Circuit
found incompatible with its serious constitutional reservations and its consequent unwillingness to interpret the Act,
with no support added by the 1977 Amendments, to authorize
imposition of sanctions on uncooperative states as violators.
One other transportation controls case of significance
arose under the Air Act prior to the 1977 Amendments; but
this case occurred in a different context and received dissimilar judicial treatment."2 The State of New York, with
the assistance of New York City and various city agencies,
79.

See discussion in text accompanying notes 95-145 infra.

80. District of Columbia v. Costle, 567 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
81. Brown v. EPA, 566 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977).
82. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 401 F. Supp. 1386 (S.D. N.Y. 1975),
rev'd, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976), modified, 422 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. N.Y.
1976), modification vacated and writ of mandamus granted, 552 F.2d 25

(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434
U.S. 902 (1977).
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prepared and submitted an extensive transportation control
plan for the Metropolitan New York City area." Although
not all legislation and regulations necessary for implementation had been adopted, and commitments for sufficient funding were wanting, EPA approved the plan (with minor revisions) in June of 1973. Nevertheless, it very soon became apparent that the designated state and city agencies
were not enforcing many of the thirty-two strategies as
promised in the plan. When the city and state refused to
comply and EPA failed to initiate enforcement proceedings
against them, environmental groups brought a citizen suit
in federal district court pursuant to Section 304, alleging
that the city and state were in violation of "emission standards and limitations" 4 in their own plan and seeking an
injunction to compel them to administer the plan as approved.
Even though the defendants admitted violation of at least
four strategies and were in various stages of compliance with
the remaining twenty-eight,"5 the district court refused to
order enforcement, primarily on procedural grounds. 8
83. The state plan included retrofitting requirements, VIM, training of mechanics, selective bans on taxicab cruising, reduction in number of parking
spaces, expanded use of exclusive bus lanes, increased bus service, staggering of work hours and days, bridge tolls, off-hour delivery requirements,
and a contingency strategy to ban all private automobiles from Manhattan's
business districts. See Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118, 1121-23
(1974), in which the plan was challenged but upheld in most respects.
84. Clean Air Act § 304(a) provides in relevant part:
Sec. 304. (a) . . . any person may commence a civil action
on his own behalf(1) against any person (including (i) the United States,
and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to
the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission
standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order issued
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard
or limitation ....
85. EPA had issued notices of violation with respect to twelve of thirty-two
strategies. However, instead of initiating judicial enforcement proceedings,
it had attempted to negotiate consensual administrative orders. Although
it did obtain consent orders for eight strategies, including VIM, plaintiffs
alleged that these orders were not being complied with. The state admitted
violation of four additional strategies: reduction of business district parking, taxicab cruising limitations, bridge toll requirements, and off-hour
delivery requirements. No EPA action had been commenced to enforce the
remaining twenty strategies. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535
F.2d at 171.
86. See Friends of the Earth v. Wilson, 389 F. Supp. 1394 (S.D. N.Y. 1974)
(preliminary injunction denied); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 401
F. Supp. 1386 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) (defendants' motion to dismiss granted,
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment denied).
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This decision the Second Circuit reversed in relevant
part in an opinion which praised the citizen suit provision and
assumed its applicability.8" It instructed the lower court to
enter summary judgment directing enforcement of the four
strategies admittedly being violated. However, after the
Second Circuit's ruling on a motion for rehearing permitted
the lower court on remand to consider constitutional issues,
it did so-focusing on the intervening Supreme Court decision in NLC and finding the reasoning of the other Circuits concerning EPA-promulgated transportation control
plans to be applicable. Relying on these decisions, the district court ordered enforcement of the plan against the
state and city only to the extent that they were direct
polluters, but not to the extent of requiring them to enforce
strategies against citizen pollutors.88
The Second Circuit again reversed in a strongly worded,
if not entirely convincing, 9 opinion in Friends of the Earth
v. Carey."0 First, the court held that since the city9 could
have advanced its constitutional argument against enforcement in a petition for review of EPA's approval of the plan
in 1973 and chose instead to represent that it would enforce
the plan, the city waived its right to make such contentions
and was precluded by Section 307(b) (2) of the Act from
raising them in an enforcement proceeding under Section
304.2 The court reasoned that had the city taken such a
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d at 172-73.
Clean Air Act § 304 apparently was deemed applicable because, as
the Second Circuit explained when the case came back up, the term
"emission standard or limitation" was defined in § 304(f) to include
"a schedule or timetable of compliance . . . under an applicable implementation plan." See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d at 31.
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 422 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
See discussion in part "III. A. 4." accompanying notes 199-205 infra.
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977).
The state did not join the city in its attack on the enforceability of the
plan. Indeed, at this juncture the state defended the plan and conceded
that it was enforceable against it. See Id. at 33.
Clean Air Act § 307(b) provides in relevant part:
(b) (1) A petition for review of the Administrator's action in
approving or promulgating any implementation plan under section
110 * * * may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals
for the appropriate circuit. Any petition for review under this
subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice
of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal
Register, except that if such petition is based solely on grounds
arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for review under
this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds
arise.
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position, upon the state's submittal of the plan to EPA or in
a petition for judicial review, either EPA or the court might
well have concluded that the plan in fact failed to contain
adequate provisions for implementation and enforcementprecipitating promulgation of a substitute plan by EPA.
The Second Circuit, therefore, would not permit the city to
"renege upon its commitments" at this late date. Even
assuming no such waiver, as a second ground for its decision,
the court held that a city's failure to implement a statesubmitted plan in the preparation of which it participated
was distinguishable from failure to comply with an EPApromulgated plan and did not involve the same Tenth Amendment issues. In the court's eyes, here the state and its political subdivision had voluntarily made their own policy decisions as to how they intended to control vehicle pollution, convinced EPA of the workability of their strategies, and thereby precluded EPA promulgation. The court reasoned that
holding the city to its "pact" did not interfere with its "integral governmental functions" in violation of NLC. Unlike subjection to an EPA-promulgated plan, the city here
was simply being required to adhere to its own prior decision:
Federal imposition of policy upon the State
never took place in this case, and would only have
taken place under the Act if the State had refused
to submit its own Plan. In the context of the enforcement of the Plan through citizen suit, the
choices and procedures are the products of State
choice, not of federal policy, and may legitimately
be enforced by the district courts."
In October, 1977, the Supreme Court denied the city's
petition for certiorari. 4
II. THE WAY OF THE 1977 AMENDMENTS
A. Nonattainment Plans
By the summer of 1977, the need for congressional
action was undeniable. Even the most extended attainment
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review
could have been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject
to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.
93. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d at 39.
94. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
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deadlines were now past. Most major urban areas in the
country were still in violation of the primary standards,
particularly for the vehicle pollutants. And the federal
courts had largely refused to accept EPA's approach to
transportation controls. In August of 1977,"5 Congress
responded by including in the comprehensive 1977 Amendments an entirely new Part D, devoted exclusively to nonattainment areas, as well as a patchwork of special provisions
designed to help solve nonattainment problems.
Relief was afforded existing stationary sources which
were unable to comply with SIP requirements by insertion of a complex new Section 113 (d) allowing the issuance9 6 of "delayed compliance orders," which may extend
a source's final compliance date as far as July 1, 1979, or
three years after the compliance date specified in the "applicable implementation plan," whichever is later.97 Because of new compliance date extensions now available under
Part D, this means that such "DCO's" may give a stationary source until the mid-1980's to comply. 8 Also, a new
Section 129 expressly allowed continuation until July 1,
1979, of EPA's "offset" policy, whereby a new "major stationary source"99 was permitted to enter a nonattainment
area if, for any pollutant exceeding the primary ambient
standards, its additional emissions of such pollutants were
more than offset by reductions in emissions from other
sources in the area. 00°
Very significantly, the 1977 Amendments also made
available new extensions of the dates for attainment of the
ambient air standards upon approval of "nonattainment
95. Congress passed the legislation on August 4, and President Carter signed
it on August 7, 1977. See ELR Comment, supra note 37, at 10182.
96. By EPA or the states. See Clean Air Act § 113(d) (1), (2).
97. See Clean Air Act § 113(d) (1) (D) and § 110(d).
98. Though not necestarily without a price. See the new Clean Air Act § 120,
providing for "delayed compliance penalties."
99. Clean Air Act § 302(j) defines "major stationary source":
Except as otherwise expressly provided, the terms 'major
stationary source' and 'major emitting facility' mean any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly emits,
or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more
of any air pollutant (including any major emitting facility or
source of fugitive emissions of any such pollutant, as deteimined
by rule by the Administrator).
100. EPA's "offset" regulations are at 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979).
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plans" submitted by the states. Each state in which there
was a nonattainment area'.. was directed to adopt and submit by January 1, 1979, a plan designed to achieve attainment of each ambient air standard in each such area as expeditiously as practicable, but not later than December 31,
1982, for the primary standards.12 If, in conjunction with
submittal of this proposed nonattainment plan, a state demonstrated that it would not be possible to attain the primary
standards for ozone or carbon monoxide in an area even by
December 31, 1982, despite the use of all reasonably available
control measures, it could make provision for extension of
the deadlines for these two criteria pollutants for up until
03
December 31, 1987, if no earlier deadline is practicable."
EPA is to approve or disapprove such plans, presumably by
July 1, 1979.1"'
The Amendments impose specific requirements for approvable plans in order to insure that they will perform the
intended function. , For the "1983" extension available for
any criteria pollutant, a plan must (among other things) :"'5
(1) provide for the implementation of all reasonably available control measures as expeditiously
as practicable;
(2) require reasonable further progress during
the operation of the plan; [This term is defined in
Section 171(1) to mean annual incremental reductions in emissions which are sufficient to attain the
ambient standards at least by December 31, 1982
(or December 31, 1987, for ozone and/or CO if the
required showing is made).]
101.

102.
103.

104.
105.

EPA's exten-ive initial designations of non-attainment areas, as promultated on March 3, 1978, are at 43 Fed. Rez. 8962 (1978). Subsequent
modifications are reflected in 43 Fed. Reg. 40412, 40502, 45993 (1978),
and in 44 Fed. Reg. 5119 (1979).
The listing was quite extensive: e.g., 105 urban areas were designated
nonattainment for oxidants in the March 3 list.
Clean Air Act §§ 129(c), 172(a) (1).
Clean Air Act §§ 129(c), 172(a) (2).
According to 129(c), the further extensions is conditioned upon submittal of an additional detailed plan for control of CO and oxidants before
July 1, 1982.
Given the penalties which flow from the absence of a revised p!an on and
after that date. See part "II. B." infra. Also, see Clean Air Act § 110
(c)(1).
The requirements following in the text are taken from Clean Air Act
§ 172(b) (1)-(10).
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(3) require permits for the construction and
operation of new or modified major stationary
sources, which may be issued only under certain
strict provisions;
(4) identify and commit whatever financial and
manpower resources are necessary to carry out the
plan;
(5) include written evidence that the state, local
governments, or a regional agency have adopted the
statutes, ordinances, regulations, or other enforceable measures necessary to implement and enforce
the plan.
Clearly "all reasonably available control measures" include transportation controls.' 7 Although the 1977 Amendments removed "land-use" controls from the measures expressly available for a SIP under Section 110(a) (2) (B),
transportation controls were left on this list; and the requirement in Section 110(a) (2) (G) for VIM programs ("to
the extent necessary and practicable") was left intact. States
which seek the "1988" extension for ozone and CO must also
include (1) a program for "cost/benefit" analysis prior
to issuance of permits for major emitting facilities and
(2) a specific schedule for implementation of a VIM program. 8 The 1977 Amendments also inserted a new Section
110(a) (3) (D) which expressly' 9 requires that a plan seeking a "1988" deadline for ozone or CO include measures (1)
to establish, expand, or improve public transportation and
106. Among the requirements of Clean Air Act § 173 for issuance of a permit
to a major stationary source are the following:
(1) the source is required to comply with "lowest achievable
emission rate," as defined to be the more stringent of(a) the most stringent emission limitation imposed by any
state, or
(b) the most stringent emission limitation achieved in practice by any such source;
(2) all major emitting sources owned or operated by the permit
applicant are in compliance with the Act;
(3) the emissions from the new source are more than offset by
reductions from other sources in the area.
107. The 1977 Amendments do not expressly say so, but this is the only interpretation harmonious with other sections in the Clean Air Act: §§ 110(a)
(2) (B), (a) (3) (D), (a) (5) (E), (c) (2) (A), (c) (4), 176(a).
Also, the concept of "reasonably available control measures" came
from the Senate version of the bill; and the Senate report contains a list
of the usual transportation control measures which were assumed to be
reasonably available. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1977).
108. See Clean Air Act § 172(b) (11) (A), (B).
109. By reference to Clean Air Act § 110(c) (5) (B).
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(2) to implement transportation control measures necessary to attain and maintain national ambient standards. '
In fact, only one category of transportation control
strategies was excluded by the 1977 Amendments from
those "reasonably available control measures" required to
be included in a nonattainment plan. According to new
Section 110(a) (5), EPA may not require a state plan to
include any "indirect source review program" (ISR).111 An
indirect source is defined to mean "a facility, building, structure, installation, real property, road, or highway which
attracts, or may attract, mobile sources of pollution.."... An
indirect source review program is defined to mean a facilityby-facility review" of indirect sources in order to assure
that the emissions from the mobile sources which they attract do not prevent attainment and maintenance of the
primary standards."' The intent of this exclusion is clear,"
but its precise scope is not. Obviously it was designed to
prohibit EPA from requiring states to conduct pre-construction or pre-modification review of such indirect sources as
office buildings, shopping centers, residential subdivisions,
apartment complexes, highways, and parking lots' in order
110. Clean Air Act §§ 172(c) and 129(c) are subject to the interpretation that,
to the extent that VIM or other transportation control measures are not
reasonably available before July 1, 1982, they need not be implemented;
and, in that case, only the revision required before July 1, 1982, need
commit the state to enforcement of such strategies. See EPA's April 4,
1979, general preamble to proposed state nonattainment plans (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as "the April, 1979, preamble") 44 Fed. Reg. 20372,
20377 (1979).
111. Although Clean Air Act § 110(a) (5) (A) (i) expressly allows EPA to
"approve and enforce" any ISR program which the state chooses to adopt
and submit. Obviously, this provision can give rise to the difficult issues
at stake in Friends of the Earth - the likelihood of which is increased
by a statement in Clean Air Act § 110(a) (5) (A) (iii) which EPA interprets to mean that it will not approve revisions to eliminate any ISR
requirements unless other strategies demonstrably adequate to assure
attainment are adopted to replace them. See EPA memorandum of October
25, 1977, to regional offices reproduced in 8 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1021 (1977).
112. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (5) (C).
113. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (5) (D).
114. And made even clearer by the statement in Clean Air Act § 110(a) (5) (E)
that the term "transportation control measure" as used in § 110(a) (2)
(B), designating types of attainment methods, does not include any ISR
program.
115. The definition of "indirect source" expressly includes "parking lots, parking garages, and other facilities subject to any measure for management
of parking supply . . . including regulation of existing off-street parking,
but such term does not include new or existing on-street parking." Clean
Air Act § 110(a) (5) (C).
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to evaluate their effect on vehicle pollutants and veto any
project which would contribute to the problem. EPA, however, had never attempted to force the states to do this.11
Instead it had used the indirect source rationale to support
its imposition of VIM, retrofit, bus purchase, and bus/carpool lane regulations, etc., upon the states' "transportation
systems."'17 Clearly many of these strategies-VIM, retrofitting, gasoline rationing, bus purchases, carpool programs,
bike lanes, and (by statute) regulation of onstreet parking
-do not constitute ISR. Less certain is whether the term
comprehends creation of bus and carpool lanes, freeway
and bridge tolls, vehicle-free zones, and restrictions on the
use of commercial vehicles-especially when the strategy
is being considered for an existing street or highway, rather
than for one prior to its construction or modification. Congress intended to bar federally mandated land-use planning,
not eliminate the necessary ingredients of transportation control plans. Uncertainties of classification should not, therefore, be resolved in favor of finding ISR.
Also, according to the new statutory scheme, no plan
promulgated by EPA may include any ISR program'--except EPA "shall have the authority to promulgate, implement, and enforce regulations under Section 110 (c) respecting indirect source review programs which apply only to
federally assisted highways, airports, and other major federally assisted indirect sources and federally owned or operated indirect sources..... Given the breadth of federal financial assistance today, to both state and private operations, "' this exception could swallow a significant part of
the rule. This would certainly be true if EPA is allowed to
promulgate rules which require the states to implement and
116. For example, whenever EPA included measures for management of parking supply in plans which it promulgated, it provided for implementation
by EPA, and only for delegation of authority to states which so desired.
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.251, 52.493 (1974).
117. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
118. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (5) (A) (ii).
Without question this prohibition was aimed at EPA's existing regulations whereby it claimed the authority to conduct preconstruction review
of indirect sources such as highways, industrial facilities, office buildings,
and apartments. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.22(b) (1974).
119. Clean Air Act § 110(a) (5) (B).
120. E.g., to highways, schools, and low-income housing.
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enforce ISR for major federally-assisted indirect sources.
The better interpretation of this provision, therefore, is that
EPA itself
may implement and enforce ISR for such
121
sources.
B. Carrots and Sticks
Still, the majority of transportation control measures
are not ISR; and, to the extent that they are "reasonably
available" and necessary for "reasonable further progress"
toward attainment, they must be incorporated within nonattainment plans submitted and carried out by the states.
But, well aware of EPA's previous lack of success in attempting to directly control the states, Congress designed new
carrots and sticks to encourage such state submittal and implementation.
The first, and probably the primary incentive for states
to submit and carry out satisfactory revised plans is contained in new statutory provisions which, read together,
12 otherwise prohibit the construction or modification 1 of
major stationary sources in any nonattainment area. Section 110 (a) (2) (I) requires that SIPs themselves require
such a permitting ban after June 30, 1979, unless the plans
meet the requirements of part D relating to nonattainment.1"I Section 172 (a) (1) states that these provisions designed to insure attainment "are required by Section 110 (a)
121.

Also, the former interpretation would take EPA into substantial constitutional difficulties. See discussion in parts "III. A. 1.-3." in text accompanying notes 176-98 infra.
122. According to Clean Air Act § 171(4), for purposes of Part D and § 110
(a) (2) (I) the terms "modification" and "modified" mean the same as
the term "modification" as used in § 111 (a) (4).
§ 111(a) (4) provides:
The term 'modification' means any physical change in, or
change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which
increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source
or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted.
123. In fact, long before July 1, 1979, each SIP did have a provision, either
approved or promulgated, which [pursuant to EPA regulations at 40
C.F.R. § 51.18 (1978)] barred construction or modification that would
cause a violation after the "original" attainment date. The only permissible exception to this bar was the Offset Ruling, which-according to
EPA's construction of Clean Air Act § 129(a)--ceases to apply on July 1,
1979. Therefore, even offsetting is not allowed after June 30 without an
approved (or promulgated) nonattainment plan. See supplementary information to EPA's interpretative rule of July 2, 1979, at 44 Fed. Reg. 38471,
38472 (1979) (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the July, 1979,
interpretive rule").

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/1

30

Battle: Transportation Controls under the Clean Air Act - An Experience i

1980

TRANSPORTATION CONTROLS

(2) (I) as a pre-condition for the construction or modification of any major stationary source in any [nonattainment]
area after July 1, 1979." This statutory restriction is automatic and mandatory until a satisfactory nonattainment
plan has been approved or promulgated.' 24 Even after an
adequate nonattainment plan is in place, no permit for the
construction or modification of a major stationary source
may be issued unless the plan is being properly carried out.
Section 173(4) expressly so provides. In addition to this
mandatory provision, Section 113 (a) (5) authorizes EPA to
issue an order prohibiting such construction or modification
if "a State is not acting in compliance with ...

Section 110

1

(a) (2) (I) and part D.'
Logically construed,' such an
EPA order is necessary only when a state attempts to issue a
permit despite its failure to submit or carry out the required
nonattainment plan. Also, Section 113 (a) (5) seems to assume that a state can be encouraged to administer a nonattainment plan promulgated by EPA, as well as one of its
own design, on pain of suffering a permitting ban if it does
not. Thus, in summary, the 1977 Amendments seem to prohibit the construction or modification of major stationary
sources in any nonattainment areas after June 30, 1979, if
a state fails either (1) to sumbit an adequate plan or (2) to
implement an approved or promulgated plan. 7As if a permitting ban weren't enough, the 1977 Amendments also include several provisions under which substantial and much-needed federal funds may be denied a state
which fails to submit or carry out a necessary nonattainment plan.
124. Id.
125. Or it may bring a civil action for injunctive relief and/or a civil penalty
of up to $25,000 per day of violation against an owner or operator who
attempts construction or operation despite the permitting ban. Clean Air
Act §§ 113(a) (5) & (b) (5).
126. This seems to be EPA's interpretation of these rather ambiguous provisions. See its April, 1979, preamble at 44 Fed. Reg. 20372, 20380 (1979),
and the July, 1979, interpretive rule at 44 Fed. Reg. 38471, 38472 (1979).
127. As will be discussed infra, in notes 139-41 and accompanying text, EPA
retains its duty under Clean Air Act § 110(c) to promulgate a "substitute"
plan to the extent the state fails to submit an adequate one. Such failure
to submit, therefore, should result in a permitting ban only until EPA
promulgates a plan and the state undertakes to implement it.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

31

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 1

32

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

Section 176 (a) requires that air pollution control program grants 2 s and federal highway funds 129 must be withheld from any air quality control region where transportation control measures are necessary for attainment if the EPA
Administator finds after July 1, 1979, that "the Governor
has not submitted an implementation plan which considers
each of the elements required by section 172"0 or that reasonable efforts toward submitting such an implementation plan
are not being made." A cutoff of federal financial assistance
for air pollution control seems inherently counterproductive,
but withholding federal aid to highways should provide
strong incentive for states to submit adequate plan revisions.' 3 ' While the language requiring EPA and the Transportation Department to disapprove projects and grants is
mandatory, such action is contingent upon the required finding by EPA. Certainly a reluctant EPA could not refuse
to make a finding if a state needing transportation controls
to achieve attainment in a region failed to submit any nonattainment plan or make any efforts to do so.' 2 But, except
in this extreme situation, the vague language used leaves the
nature of EPA's obligation unclear. Section 176 (a) does
not expressly make future funding contingent upon a state's
submitting a plan which meets the requirements of Section
172, but only upon submitting one which "considers" the elements of that section, or making "reasonable efforts" to do
so. In a memorandum on proposed policies on transportation
funding published on June 11, 1979,"' EPA seems to take
a rather strict position in stating that adequate consideration
includes a duty to investigate and compile data on needed
transportation control strategies and to incorporate that data
128. Upon which states may be quite dependent. -See note 234 infra.
129. Other than those available for safety, mass transit, or transportation
improvement projects related to air quality improvement or maintenance.
Clean Air Act § 176(a).
130. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
131. More than one-third of the $18.1 billion in state highway expenditures in
fiscal year 1976 came from federal grants. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE
GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1976, 18, 33 (1977).

132. Indeed, EPA admits that a finding, one way or the other, must be made
with respect to all SIP revisions whenever the primary standards for
vehicle pollutants are not being attained. See EPA's proposed policies and
procedures for applying transportation funding limitations, published on
June 11, 1979, at 44 Fed. Reg. 33473, 33474 (1979) hereinafter sometimes
referred to as "EPA's proposed policies on transportation funding").
133. Id. at 33474-75
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into a reasoned analysis of the requirements for an approvEPA suggests, moreover, that it will require
able plan.
specific evidence of good-faith efforts to expeditiously subGiven the indefinite statutory
mit an adequate plan.'
language, this construction of its authority seems well within
its discretion. As also stated in the memorandum, EPA promulgation of a plan to control vehicle pollutants will not satisfy Section 176 (a) and release the funds; a state must either
adopt EPA's plan or present an adequate revision of its own.
Perhaps strangely, a like cutoff of federal highway
funds does not follow expressly from a state's failure to implement the elements of a transportation control plan,
whether its own or one promulgated by EPA. Section 176
(b) only directs EPA self-defeatingly to withhold grants
under the Air Act from any area in which the state or responsible local governmental units are not implementing any requirements of an approved or promulgated plan. On the
other hand, Section 176(c) broadly declares, "No department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government
shall (1) engage in, (2) support in any way or provide financial assistance for, (3) license or permit, or (4) approve, any activity which does not conform to a plan after
it has been approved or promulgated under Section 110."
Narrowly construed this provision would require a state
to "implement"only to the extent of its control over a particular project or activity for which a federal permit, grant,
etc., was sought. 3 ' It is arguable, however, that this language could be interpreted by a zealous federal agency to bar
funding, permitting, or any federal approval whenever the
activity would contribute to a nonattainment problem which
is due in part to a state's failure to implement. Extensive
application of such an unlikely construction would, of course,
be unbearable to a non-cooperating state."'
The final category of funds subject to being wthheld
sewage treatment grants - may well be the most vital to
-

134. Id.
135. E.g., to the extent that an applicable plan controls the location or construction of airports, a city which proposes to build a new airport
(needing federal funds and permits) would have to comply with those
aspects of the plan.
136. To date EPA has offered no interpretation of Clean Air Act § 176(c).
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an area."3 7 Yet Section 316, added by the 1977 Amendments,
in quite convoluted terms does give EPA this enormous
leverage over states and local governments who fail to
submit or implement necessary nonattainment plans. Section 316(b) authorizes (using the word "may") the EPA
Administrator to withhold, condition, or restrict the making
of any grant for construction of sewage treatment works
if he determines that any of the following conditions exist
(among others not related to nonattainment) :
(1) a revised SIP for a nonattainment area has
not yet been approved;
(2) an approved SIP fails to account for the increase in emissions from stationary and mobile
sources in a nonattainment area which may reasonably be anticipated to result, directly or indirectly, from the new sewage treatment capacity
(i.e., from growth);
(3) an approved SIP for a nonattainment area
which does account for increased emissions resulting from a new facility is not being carried
out by the state; or
(4) the new plant may reasonably be anticipated
to cause an increase in emissions in excess of that
provided for in an approved SIP, or the plant
would otherwise not be in conformity with the
plan.
Despite some ambiguity in Section 316 (b) and the discretion which the Administrator has in applying it, EPA has
evidenced its apparent intent to take essentially the position
outlined above. In its notice of interim policy on sewage
137. Besides the obvious natural need for new and expanded sewage treatment
plants, to replace old ones and accommodate growth, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) effectively mandates new plants in many
instances. Under § 301(b) (1) (B) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)
(1) (B), publicly-owned sewage treatment plants discharging into waters
of the United States must adopt "secondary treatment" standards established by EPA by July 1, 1977, plus whatever extension (up to six years)
is granted under § 301(i) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i) (1). The statutory
penalty for failure to meet these standards is a ban on any new tie-ins,
thereby stopping virtually any growth in the area. § 402(h), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(h). To enable the states to meet these standards, however, the
FWPCA provides for EPA to make grants of up to 75% of the cost of
construction. § 201(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a) (1). The expense is usually
so great that the federal funding is essential. Withholding such a grant,
therefore, may effectively prevent construction-which will result in a
tie-in ban halting growth.
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plant construction published on July 2, 1979,"'8 EPA proposed to withhold grants until state-submitted nonattainment plans have been approved. Once a revised plan has
been approved which accounts for the emissions associated
with proposed treatment works, if EPA determines that
the state is not carrying it out so as to make "reasonable
further progress" toward attainment for the vehicle pollutants, it proposes to condition any grant to allow only
hook-ups that are sufficient to serve the existing population.
Thus EPA is given another sizable carrot or stick,
depending on one's viewpoint - to "encourage" states to
create and implement transportation controls.
Although in 1977 Congress gave EPA this arsenal of
new weapons, it did not take away the power which EPA
asserted under the 1970 Amendments - direct enforcement action against uncooperative states. Section 110(c),
the authority under which EPA promulgated substitute
plans directed against the states, was left intact in all relevant respects. 3 ' EPA's duty under Section 110(c), therefore, clearly includes the obligation to promulgate a substitute nonattainment plan, or portion thereof, to the extent a state fails to submit an approvable one. 4 ' And EPA
has indicated that it is prepared to perform this obligation.141 Of course, the duty to promulgate a nonattainment plan does not necessarily presume the authority to
promulgate it in terms that force a state to implement it.
This was the leap that two Circuit Courts were unwilling
to make under the pre-1977 Act. Yet, despite Congress' full
awareness of the artful construction'. which EPA gave to
138.
139.

44 Fed. Reg. 38575, 38577 (1979).
Significantly, the choice to preserve EPA's § 110(c) obligation was made
over the House version of the bill which expressly denied EPA the authority
to promulgate (or even enforce) nonattainment plan provisions, leaving it
only the power to implement offset requirements. See H.R. 6161, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 127(f), 123 Cong. Rec. 5059 (1977).
140. If this point needs any further support, it plainly exists in the requirement in Clean Air Act § 172(b) (1) that a nonattainment plan "be adopted
by the State (or promulgated by the Administrator under section 110(c))
after reasonable notice and public hearing." (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, the federal assistance limitations in Clean Air Act § 176
(b) and (c) are based on a state's failure to implement, or an activity's
failure to conform to, a plan "approved or promulgated under section 110."
141. See EPA's June, 1979, proposed policies on transportation funding, 44 Fed.
Reg. 33473, 33474 (1979).
142. See discussion in text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
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Sections 113 (a) (1) and 302 (e),113 it changed these sections
in no relevant respect. One could certainly say that, in light
of judicial reluctance to accept EPA's construction, no support should be found in Congress' inaction. The legislative
history of the 1977 Amendments, however, can be read to
indicate that Congress intended to allow such federal enforcement against the states - at least where EPA does
not order states to enact legislation and promulgate regulations.' It is difficult to argue that when Congress inserted Section 113(a) (5), giving EPA the power to impose
a permitting ban if a state fails to submit or implement a
nonattainment plan, it intended to make this sanction exclusive of EPA's previously-asserted authority under Section 113 (a) (1). On the other hand, it is even more difficult
to argue that the amendment to Section 304, expressly
authorizing citizen suits against any person (including a
state) who is alleged to be in violation of "any requirement
under an applicable implementation plan relating to transportation control measures," allows citizens to sue to compel
state implementation. Under Section 304, as under Section
113 (a) (1), the problem remains whether state implementation is itself a proper plan "requirement." All this may
compel a candid admission that there is little more pursuasive authority than before the 1977 Amendments to
either support or contradict EPA's interpretation. Thus, if
EPA again presses the point, 4 ' a court may be as free as
before to avoid the difficult constitutional questions.
C. EPA Efforts to Preserve the Spirit of the Act
As of this writing four months have passed since the
July 1, 1979, "deadline," and EPA has not yet finally apIndeed, on the eve of the 1977 Amendments, EPA asserted such enforcement authority in its revisions to its VIM regulations for California
and the National Capital areas. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30504, 30505 n. 15 (1977).
144. Both the 1977 House Report and an explanatory statement by the Senate
manager of the 1977 Amendments essentially adopted EPA's arguments
in favor of such authority. H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at
288, 290, 315-16; 123 Cong. Rec. § 9168 (daily ed. June 8, 1977).
These sources may also be read. to support EPA enforcement to
compel states to implement their own plans. See Luneburg, The National
Quest for Clean Air 1970-1978, Intergovernmental Problems and Some
Proposed Solutions, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 397, 447 (1978).
145. Apparently EPA has not abandoned its original approach. In a footnote
to its April, 1979, preamble, EPA states that, although it has left litiga-

143.
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proved any nonattainment plans containing transportation
control measures 46 nor promulgated any substitute plans.147
However, no permit thus far has been denied a major stationary source on these grounds; no federal funds have been
withheld from state air programs, highways, or sewage treatment plants; and no action has been taken by EPA to
resume enforcement of pre-existing transportation control
plans.148 This is all so because EPA reads the applicable
sections of the Act in ways which reduce their scope and
buy as much time as possible for it and the states to perform their statutory functions.
States were late in filing their proposed plans. "9 Many
of those submitted are deficient in varying degrees.1 EPA
has not yet had time to fully evaluate them, complete negotiations regarding their deficiencies, or promulgate substitute plans. 1 ' With the hope of soon arriving at SIP's which
are approvable in most respects, EPA is understandably
reluctant to invoke the sanctions at its disposal. Such reluctance is especially understandable in view of the perceived
present disaffection in the country with environmental reg-

146.

147.
148.
149.
t50.

151.

tion and administrative proceedings concerning its previous regulations
in abeyance in order to concentrate on plan revisions, it "still believes
that the Clean Air Act provides a basis for promulgating enforceable
transportation control measures requiring state implementation." 44 Fed.
Reg. 20372, 20374 n. 15 (1979).
Indeed, as of the first of November, EPA has formally acted on but five
SIP's. Only Wyoming (which had but one nonattainment area-for particulates) has had its plan fully approved. Vermont's plan has received
"conditional approval," as have parts of Georgia's and Colorado's plans.
The plan submitted by South Dakota has been disapproved (because of
unacceptable regulations for permitting major stationary sources). No
final or conditional action has been taken on any other state plan. Only
North Dakota and Hawaii contained no nonattainment areas and were,
therefore, not required to submit revised plans. See special state-by-state
report on revised SIPs in 10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 923, 924,
927, 928 (1979), and the update in 10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
1472 (1979).
Although Clean Air Act § 110(c),. on its face, requires EPA promulgation
(or opproval) within six month of the January 1, 1979, submittal deadlines set by § 129(c).
See note 145 supra.
In the latter part of May, 1979, EPA stated that it had received revised
SIPs for 30 out of 56 states and territories. 10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS 119 (1979).
For example, as of the first of August, nine states requiring VIM legislation for approval did not have it, including five of the largest: New York,
10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT
California, Ohio, Michigan, and Colorado.
DEVELOPMENTS 23 (1979).
EPA's most recently revised forecast is that it will have acted on about
ten SIPs by the end of November, on another ten by the end of the year,
and will have taken final action on a majority by mid-1980. See 10 ENvIR.
REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1472 (1979).
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ulation'52 and some movement afoot in Congress to extend
the approval/disapproval deadline, if not to make substantive
amendments to the Act." 3 Strict construction at this time
might well provoke a legislative backlash far more damaging
to air pollution control than interpretations sympathetic to
state problems.
EPA's April, 1979, general preamble to publication
of state-submitted plans contains several significant lenient
interpretations of the Act."' With considerably more certainty than is supported by statutory language," 5' it states
that "reasonably available control measures" are not required if less will suffice for "reasonable further progress"
to attainment and such control measures will not result in
attainment any faster.' A position even more substantially,
and questionably, softening the plan requirements of Section
172(b) is EPA's further explanation that it is not now
requiring state adoption of transportation control measures
' Instead, for these and
or VIM in legally enforceable form. 57
certain other measures, it construes the Act to allow approval
of plans containing "schedules for expeditious development,
152.

153.

154.
155.
156.
157.

After experiencing fuel shortages in the summer and hearing President
Carter declare war against the energy crisis in a televised speech on
July 15, 1979, 55% of the persons responding to a Gallup poll for Newsweek conducted on July 18 and 19, 1979, stated that they would favor
relaxing laws and regulations designed to protect the environment in
order to produce more energy. Only 30% questioned in this poll opposed
such relaxation of environmental laws. See Newsweek, July 30, 1979, at
28. Congress apparently perceives such public attitudes and is responding accordingly. Upon returning from Labor Day recess, it quickly dealt
multiple blows to the environment: it exempted Tellico Dam from the
Endangered Species Act and any other law prohibiting its construction;
tho Senate approved amendments to the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act which extend its deadlines and exempt state programs
from regulations issued by the Office of Surface Mining; and bills to give
a new Energy Mobilization Board power to override state and federal
substantive and procedural laws gained momentum. See 10 ENviR. REP.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1151, 1152 (1979). A bill to create the Energy
Mobilization Board to speed priority energy projects passed in the Senate
on October 4. A similar bill passed in the House on November 1. See
10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1335, 1495 (1979).
A bill to postpone the deadline one year was introduced in the House on
January 18, 1979, and by July 30 had 120 co-sponsors. A similar bill was
introduced in the Senate on May 11. 1979. These bills have prompted a
House subcommittee to hold oversight hearings, but as of this writing they
seem to lack sufficient push to pass. See 10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 119, 923 (1979).
44 Fed. Reg. 20372 (1979).
See Clean Air Act § 172(b) (2), (3).
44 Fed. Reg. at 20375.
Cf. Clean Air Act § 172(b) (7), (10).
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adoption, submittal, and implementation.""' The interpretive rule' 0 published by EPA on July 2, 1979, contains
additional and somewhat more justifiable modifications."'

First, EPA there declared that major stationary source
permits for which applications were received prior to July 1,
1979, would be "grandfathered" - meaning that they would
be issued despite the absence of any approved nonattainment plan if offset requirements are satisfied. EPA stated
that the statutory permitting ban applies only to permits
applied for after June 30, 1979."0 Thus, as EPA explained,c'

because a typical permit takes approximately three months
to process, it postponed any potential impact at least
that long. By then it hoped to have approved most plans thereby allowing it to issue permits processed during this
interim. 1 2 The sort of approval which EPA anticipates for
many areas, however, is not necessarily the final approval
which the Act seems to contemplate, but "conditional approval." In conjunction with its July, 1979, interpretive
rule, EPA published a "supplement" to its April, 1979,
preamble in which it stated its intention to conditionally
approve plans containing "minor deficiencies" for states
providing assurances that they will submit corrections on
specified schedules. For such states, permitting bans will
fall only if adequate corrections are not made on schedule.'
158. 44 Fed. Reg. at 20375-76.
Further on in the preamble EPA states that for areas seeking post1982 attainment dates for ozone or CO it is requiring by June 30, 1979,
assurances of adequate legal authority to implement VIM no later than
the end of 1982-unless before June 30, 1979, the Senate had no opportunity to consider necessary enabling legislation. Here it also says,
however, that plans providing for such extended dates need only contain
"schedules" for implementation of those "currently planned" transportation
control measures which are reasonably available and for "analysis, selection, and adoption" of any additional ones needed. 44 Fed. Reg. at 20377.
159. To be added to 40 C.F.R. Part 52, Subpart A, as new § 52.24.
160. The interpretive rule, preceded by supplementary information, is at 44
Fed. Reg. 88471 (1979).
161. Id. at 38472-73.
162. Id. at 38471. See also EPA memorandum to regional directors, reproduced
in 10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 250 (1979). After three months
had passed, however, EPA had to revise its expectations. See note 151
supra. With approval still months away for most states, EPA has resorted
to "monitoring" permit applications in order to be informed of any economic
disruption or delays caused energy projects. See 10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS 1472 (1979).
163. See 44 Fed. Reg. 38583 (1979).
If the conditional approval given Colorado's plan [published at 44 Fed.
Reg. 57401 (1979)] is any indication, EPA is willing to conditionally approve a plan containing quite substantial deficiencies based upon its ex-
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Other lenient interpretations by EPA have a firmer
statutory base. Completely consistent with the language of
the Act,"" EPA will limit the new source restriction to the
particular nonattainment area for which a plan is inadequate
or is not being carried out; it will not apply to attainment
areas or areas in the state for which plans are approved
and being implemented.' Also, EPA intends to confine the
restriction on new sources to major sources of the specific
pollutant for which the area was designated as nonattainment and for which an approved plan is not being carried
out. " 6 Of course, it recognizes that a ban will not apply to
non-major sources under any circumstance.6 7 EPA's proposed policies and procedures for applying the limitations
placed by Section 176 (a) on federal funding for Air Act
and highway construction grants are similarly restrained." 8
It proposes to apply these funding limitations to only the
geographic areas under the control of the government
agency directly responsible for the failure to submit.'69 It
assumes for itself the discretion to continue to make grants
under the Air Act if they are "necessary for immediate air
quality benefits or development of SIP revisions."' 70 Under
the procedures which it proposes for applying the assistance
pectation that corrections will made pursuant to the timetable which it imposes. Conditional approval is widely believed to be of questionable legality.
See 10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1342 (1979). Its continued use
may well depend upon the restraint shown by states and environmental
groups confident of their ability to have it struck down in court if they so
desire.
164. Clean Air Act §§ 110(a) (2) (I), 172 (a)(]), 173(4), 113(a) (5).
165. See the July, 1979, interpretive rule, 44 Fed. Reg. at 38473.
To supplement this interpretive rule, EPA on the same day published
a proposed rule to extend its application to major stationary sources to
be constructed outside the nonattainment area (but within the same
state) if they would cause a violation of an ambient standard within
the nonattainment area. This proposed rule would, however, exempt from
the permitting ban sources, whether within or without the nonattainment
area, which are distant enough from a place where a standard is violated
that their contribution to tha problem is minmal. 44 Fed. Reg. 38583
(1979).
166. 44 Fed. Reg. at 38473.
167.

See EPA memorandum, 10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS at 251.

44 Fed. Reg. 33473 (1979).
It also states that the area affected may be less than an entire air quality
control region [which does not jibe with the letter of Clean Air Act §
176(a)] and that funding may be withheld only from specific agencies.
Id. at 33474.
170. Id. at 33476.
On firmer ground, it also interprets quite broadly the exclusions for
safety and macs transit projects and transportation projects related to
168.
169.

air quality.

Id.
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limitations, it may be the end of October before any funds
are withheld; and even then they are not lost but placed in
escrow for release upon a finding that reasonable efforts
are being made toward submittal.'" Regarding the restrictions on sewage treatment grants under Section 316, EPA's
intended policy is likewise circumscribed: limitations would
only apply to specific areas in default; grant applications
would be processed in anticipation of issuance upon compliance; and conditions and restrictions, rather than outright withholding, would be used in most instances."'
In at least some respects, EPA obviously is treading a
fine line between "preserving the spirit of the Act" and
encountering a successful citizen suit to enforce the letter
of the law.' Although the statutory bases may be thin for
its constructions which avoid immediate and wholesale use
of the sanctions by extending the opportunity to arrive at
adequate state plans,' EPA's political judgment is hard to
fault. Such judicious interpretations may well provide the
flexibility necessary to carry the Act through its most fragile
period. EPA's constructions which confine the reach of the
funding and permitting sanctions,'' of course, serve the
same political purpose; but they have the additional advantage of standing on more solid statutory footing and may
prove critical to keeping its application of these sanctions
within the bounds of constitutionality. Such, at least, is the
author's opinion, explained in the next section.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO SANCTIONS FOR
STATE UNCOOPERATIVENESS

At this time it seems likely that EPA will soon invoke
some of the weapons statutorily placed at its disposal and,
consequently, bring their constitutionality to the test. Cer171. Id. at 33475.
172. See EPA notice of interim policy on sewage plant contruction, 44 Fed.
Reg. 38575 (1979).
173. At this time, however, indications are that the major environmental groups
may be equally sensitive to the dangers of triggering a legislative backlash and may be sympathetic to EPA's bending of the law in order lo save
it. See testimony of David Hawkins, EPA Assistant Adminictra'or for
Air, Noise, and Radiation, at a House subcommittee oversight hearing
on July SO, 1979, as reported in 10 ENVIR. REP. CURRENT DEVELO.MENTS
923 (1979).
174. See notes 154-63 and accompanying text ,upra.
175. See notes 164-72 and accompanying text supra.
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tainly it can be expected to employ funding and permitting
sanctions long before it resurrects its earlier-tried strategy
of direct enforcement against the states. If nothing else, its
previous lack of success makes unlikely any quick attempt
to wield this big stick again. The author, however, will first
treat in this section the restrictions placed by the Constitution on such direct compulsion. He does so because the most
difficult issues regarding the constitutionality of funding
and permitting limitations concern their application to promote state action which is beyond the constitutional reach
of direct compulsion. It is first necessary, therefore, to establish the limits to that reach. Thus, although these newlyavailable carrots are much nearer to application, their treatment will await analysis of the method already challenged
in the courts with substantial success.
A.

Direct Enforcement Against the States

Time will not be spent here discussing whether or not
the Act authorizes EPA to enforce, through civil and criminal proceedings, a promulgated plan requirement that a
state implement transportation controls. Enough has already
been discussed1 '1 to support an opinion either way. Section
113(a) (1), on its face, authorizes an administrative order
or a civil suit by EPA to compel compliance with any
requirement in a plan. The question not answered by any
language in the Act is whether EPA can properly promulgate as part of a plan a requirement that the state implement the plan. The overall scheme of the Act may indicate
that it cannot;177 legislative history may indicate that it
can.'78 Consequently, room exists for a court to find either
way based upon its view of the constitutional issues presented. Although a court may well conclude that such enforcement is beyond the scope of the Act, it can be expected
to do so in order to "avoid" serious constitutional problems. 7 ' The seriousness of these constitutional problems
176. See notes 52-56, 139-45, and accompanying text supra.
177. Especially EPA's duty under Clean Air Act § 113(a) (2)
the state fails to do so.
178. See note 144 supra.
179. The rationale employed by the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.
66, 81, and accompanying text supra.
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presented by enforcement against the states of various
transportation control methods, therefore, will be treated
herein as the decisive factor.
Other than the recent experience under the pre-1977
Act and the Circuit Court decisions involving it, there exists
no close precedent, historical or legal, to determine the constitutionality of applying federal force so directly against
the states. National League of Cities v. Usery ("NLC"), of
course, overshadows the area; but its facts are quite different from any involved in transportation controls; and,
as pointed out by Justice Brennan in his dissent,"'0 the
majority opinion provides little guidance as to what are
and are not "essential governmental functions." '' NLC's
chief precedential support was in decisions finding constitutional limits to the federal taxing power when directed
at state operations; but such decisions themselves use
similarly broad language helpful primarily as expressions
of political principle.' 2 Strained analogy was made by the
Court to Coyle v. Oklahoma 8 ' - denying Congress the
power to dictate to a state the location of its capital - but
none will be attempted here. The only cases cited in NLC
involving situations at all similar to any transportation
control measure were those distinguished and reaffirmed
by the Court: United States v. California' and like deci180. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 872-75 (dissenting opinion).
181. Besides speaking broadly in terms of 'integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions." Id. at 852, the Court only stated
that this category included the right "to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation,
public health, and parks and recreation." Id. at 851.
182. The major taxation case relied on by the Court, New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), upheld a federal tax on New York State's
sales of mineral water. There the plurality opinion of Chief Justice
Stone rejected any distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary"
interests and instead stated that even "nondiscriminatory" taxes on state
activities might be struck down if they "interfere unduly with the State's
performance of its sovereign function of government." 326 U.S. at 586-87.
Two years after NLC, in Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444
(1978), the Court sustained an annual federal registration tax on all
civil aircraft as applied to a stateowned helicopter used exclusively for
police functions, four justices reasoning that a tax approximating the
cost of the federal services that were provided created no undue danger
of use by the federal government "to control, unduly interfere with, or
destroy a State's ability to perform essential services." 435 U.S. 466-67.
183. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
184. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

43

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 1

44

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

sions " ' sustaining federal regulation of state-owned railroads. This the court held not to be "an area that the States
have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities.' ' 86 In this light, it may be productive to first consider
the constitutionality of a form of federal regulation of
state-controlled air pollution closely analogous to regulation
of railroads: application of federal emission standards to
state-owned vehicles and stationary sources. With reasoning
here developed as a base, perhaps it will be easier to analyze
the constitutionality of the more burdensome transportation
controls imposed under EPA's "indirect source" approach.
1. State-owned direct sources
Federal emission standards are routinely applied to
state and municipal vehicles, power plants, incinerators,
and similar direct sources of air pollution. Does NLC place
such regulation in jeopardy? Certainly it seems very close
to the application of federal safety standards to a stateowned railroad; but the argument may be made that power
generation, waste disposal, and police protection (in vehicles) are more traditional governmental functions. NLC,
however, does not disallow any federal regulation of such
functions; its prohibition is against displacement of "state
policies regarding the manner in which they will structure
[their] delivery."' 7 It should be hard to argue convincingly
that holding the state to the same emission standards applied
to like private activities would displace significant governmental policies regarding performance of these services.
Surely a "policy" in the sense the term was used in NLC
means much more than a desire to burn regular gasoline
or save the cost of installation of scrubbers. The cost of such
pollution controls may well be great and burdensome to a
community; however, in NLC cost alone was not the key but pervasive costs which displaced delivery of vital services.
If nothing else, the concurring opinion with which
Justice Blackmun cast his "swing vote" in NLC indicates
185.

Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); California v. Taylor, 353
U.S. 553 (1957).
186. National League of Cities v. Uzery, 426 U.S. at 855 n. 18.
187. Id. at 847.
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that a majority on the present Court would permit such
federal environmental regulation of state-owned direct
sources."' His view of the decision as a "balancing approach," however, leaves much to be desired. If Congress
reasonably concludes that regulation of state facilities is
necessary, the Court should be very disinclined to secondguess that decision by weighing the respective interests at
stake.' 9 A better way to distinguish such regulation from
the situation in NLC is to emphasize the object of the Court's
concern: substantial interference with governmental decisionmaking. This distinction focuses attention on preserving the most essential feature of state and local government
- the creation and implementation of policies and programs
on behalf of their citizens.
Of course, governmental policies and programs are
normally carried out through legislation and agency regulations; but merely effecting or necessitating state regulations, or even legislation, should not be the touchstone.
If it were, most federal control would be barred. States act
through legislation and regulations in providing nearly all
of their services - even in running a railroad or a power
plant - and virtually any federal regulation thereof will
require some adjustment in such state "laws." The constitutional line should be drawn to protect a state's decision
whether or not to use its lawmaking powers to create and
run a program which it may or may not feel is to the
benefit of its citizens. In the case of federal regulation of
emissions from state-owned direct sources, the state is not
being forced to establish and administer mobile police units,
power plants, or incinerators; it is merely being told that
if it is going to undertake such activities it must not run
them in ways which the federal government has determined
In relevant part, Justice Blackmun stated:
I may misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it seems to me
that it adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw federal
power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance
with imposed federal standards would be essential.
Id. at 856.
189. So also advises Professor Richard Stewart in an article extensively analyzing federalism problems in implementation of the Air Act. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196, 1236
(1977).
188.
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to be hazardous to health. This is a far cry from requiring
federally-structured programs to be created and run by the
states.
The argument may be made, however, that many sorts
of transportation control measures do entail just such
creation and implementation of programs not desired by
the states. But here the author believes that a distinction,
somewhat similar to that drawn by the D.C. Circuit,' can
be made between (1) transportation control measures which
are directed at the state's operation of a highway system
itself and (2) those which require the state to regulate the
private users of that system.
2. Operation of state highway systems
In this category are included creation of bus and carpool lanes, imposition of freeway and bridge tolls, and restriction of on-street parking. The management of streets
and highways no doubt may be considered organically an
"essential function" of state and local governments. But
these regulations directed exclusively toward a few ingredients of a state's overall operation of its highways should
not be equated with dictating fundamental policy choices in
structuring a transportation system. The state makes such
basic governmental decisions when it decides whether to
build a freeway (in lieu of another means of transportation)
and what traffic safety laws will be enforced on it. But
every detail involving operation of highways cannot be made
a sacred cow, immune from federal regulation, without
drawing an unjustifiable distinction between state-owned
direct and indirect sources. The author must admit to being
pursuaded by EPA's reasoning on this score." Entirely
apart from any notion of blame for the vehicles attracted,
states and local governments clearly do own and operate
their streets and highways. Requiring them to regulate
their physical use is indistinguishable in principle from
controlling the fuels burned in state vehicles and power
plants in order to minimize the pollutants they emit or
190.

District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d at 988-90.
accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
191. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
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from restricting the industrial wastes processed by municipal sewage treatment plants in order to control their
pass-through of dangerous pollutants. Surely states owning
fairgrounds and stadiums may be required by federal law
to manage such facilities and their parking accomodations
in order to reduce dust, noise, and solid waste. Is there any
relevant difference between such situations and federal
rules requiring states to take certain steps to limit the
number of vehicles attracted by their roads?
Again, any of these measures may well require state
or local legislation or regulations; but only to the extent
such authority is needed before the governmental entity may
act in any new endeavor - however unessential to its fundamental duties to its citizens. The expense to which
bus/carpool lanes, toll collection, and on-street parking
controls put the governmental bodies concerned usually will
not be so disproportionate to the normal costs of maintaining a highway system that they could reasonably complain
that they are forced to restrict essential services to their
citizens. Certainly, to the extent such costs are offset by
federal grants under existing mass transit and highway
programs, complaints should not be taken seriously.
Obviously, with so little precedent and so much of one's
analysis dependant upon his political philosophy, the author's
views are subject to criticism. Admittedly, unless one is
willing to allow either all or nothing in the way of federal
regulation of state control of pollution, the analytical process becomes a matter of line drawing. The closer one gets
to the line, the more tenuous becomes his reasoning. With
bus/carpool lanes, tolls, and on-street parking, the author
recognizes strains in his analysis; but he believes that the
policy behind NLC keeps such regulations, at least in the
majority of cases, on the constitutional side of the line. That
line, however, is crossed by measures such as EPA's 1973
VIM and retrofit regulations which required states to
establish and administer whole new programs to regulate
their citizenry.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980
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3. Regulation of private motorists
The Ninth,. 2 Fourth," 3 and D.C. Circuits' 9 ' understandably expressed strong reservations about the constitutionality of EPA's VIM and retrofit regulations. States'
decisions concerning the regulation of purely private activities of their citizens are of the essence of governmental
functions. If the Tenth Amendment means anything, it
must bar the federal government from directly controlling
the states' performance of such sovereign duties. Although
decisions whether or not to establish and carry out VIM
and retrofit programs may not be themselves vital to states'
"integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system," they do involve essentially governmental activity
which should be protected from direct federal control. To
fail to erect a constitutional barrier to such unprecedented
assertion of federal power would be to risk reducing the
states to "puppets of a ventriloquist Congress."'
The federal wage and hour legislation struck down in
NLC itself presented nothing like the threat to state sovereignty of requirements that states establish and implement entire administrative programs."' In fact, because
NLC involved a different, more problematical situation
resulting in a vague test, it might be wise to enunciate a
separate and more specific standard to ensure that in this
special context the constitutional line is bright and clear.
That stated by the Ninth Circuit in Brown I has sufficient
clarity and specificity to recommend it: although the federal
commerce power encompasses commerce engaged in by a
state, it does not extend to a state's regulation of the commerce of others.9 7 Such a standard may be reconciled with
192.
193.
194.
195.

Brown v. EPA, supra note 61.
Maryland v. EPA, supra note 66.
District of Columbia v. Train, supra note 67.
As characterized by the Ninth Circuit, Brown v. EPA, supra note 61, at
839.
196. As the Ninth Circuit held in "Brown II," no constitutionally significant
difference exists between expressly requiring a state to adopt certain
laws and regulations and "simply" requiring it to establish and carry
out a program, whether or not special legislation or regulations are
necessary. 566 F.2d at 672. The determinative factor should not be
whether statutes and regulations are required-but whether the state is
being compelled to govern its citizens in a certain manner.
197. Brown v. EPA, supra note 61, at 838-40.
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the Court's analysis in NLC by reasoning that it is the
Tenth Amendment which so restrains the commerce power
from intruding into this sovereign domain.198
4. Enforcement of state-submitted plans
The same constitutional protection should be afforded
a state when EPA, or a citizen invoking Section 304, attempts to compel it to implement a transportation control
measure that is part of a plan which the state itself submitted. The reasoning of the Second Circuit to the contrary
in Friends of the Earth v. Carey" 9' does not withstand
scrutiny. It is nothing short of absurd to hold that a state
or local government involved in preparing and submitting
a plan could have contested its approval by EPA (within
sixty days) on grounds of the unconstitutionality of its
compelled implementation, and that under Section 307(b)
(2) failure to do so bars reassertion as a defense to an
enforcement proceeding. The constitutional argument would
not have been an objection to the adequacy of the plan submitted; it is a defense which only arises when EPA or a
citizen invokes such construction of enforcement authority
against the state or local government. It is only slightly
more rational, but still very unconvincing, to characterize
the state's submission of a plan as so "voluntary" that it
bars it from "reneging" on its "pact" and asserting constitutional defenses to compelled implementation. Waiver of
This constitutional analysis would similarly condemn any EPA effort
directly to compel states to implement gasoline rationing plans, ISR programs, parking supply management systems, programs for staggered
work hours for non-state employees, and like strategies requiring establishment of new programs for state regulation of private activities.
Other strategies suggested for enforcement against the states might
fall to the more general NLC standard. Certainly any federal attempt to
mandate staggered work hours for state employees is far too close to NLC
itself to have much chance of survival. To the extent a bicycle program
required the exercise of eminent domain, it might be deemed to impinge
upon a traditional sovereign function. Requiring the establishment and
administration of a bus system might well be so expensive that it would
foreclose other governmental activities and would run afoul of NLC for
that reason alone. Also, forcing state and/or local government to implement a transit system might simply be viewed as substantial displacement of integral governmental decisions.
Further attempt at piecemeal analysis of various transportation
control measures which might be enforced against the states will not be
attempted. Enough has been discussed to provide adequate background
for the more pressing issues concerning the constitutionality of funding
and permitting limitations.
199. See text accompanying notes 00-94 supra.
198.
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constitutional defenses is not to be so lightly presumed.0-0
Certainly such an inequitable2 0 1 conclusion should not be
drawn when the "voluntary" submittal was obtained under
the threat of EPA substitute promulgation and enforce2
ment.1
To the extent the state plan approved consists of state
statutes and regulations, suits may be brought under state
law... to require the appropriate state officers and agents
to perform their nondiscretionary legal duties - until such
statutes and regulations are repealed. If, however, no applicable state statute or regulation makes independently binding a part of an approved plan, °4 the Air Act should not be
construed to make it so. The procedures under which EPA
approves state-submitted plans should not be deemed sufficient to convert promises by state executives into the equivalent of state administrative rules. For some purposes EPA
approval of a state plan may be considered federal rulemaking.0 ' If such a position was asserted, however, to
justify federal enforcement to compel state implementation,
the Tenth Amendment argument should be just as strong
as before against use of a "federal rule" to mandate state
governmental functions.
B.

Limitations on Financial Assistance

Despite the probable constitutionality of direct federal
enforcement against the states of at least some transportation control measures, the legal uncertainties and political
dangers involved make much more likely that EPA will
first invoke its new statutory powers to restrict financial
assistance and impose permitting bans. Of these two new
200. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 1.S.
458, 464 (1938) ; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
201. The inequity arising from the contrast with court holdings that direct
enforcement is not permitted against states who failed to submit adequate
plans.
202. And now funding and permitting limitations as well.
203. The citizen-suit provision in the Clean Air Act, § 304(a) (2), only authorizes suits against "the Administrator" to compel him to perform his nondiscretionary acts.
204. As apparently was the case in Friends of the Earth v, Carey, supra note
82, and as may continue to be the case under present EPA practices.
205. In Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1973); it was
deemed so for purposes of requiring the rulemaking procedures of § 553 of
the Administrative Procedure Act to be followed.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/1

50

Battle: Transportation Controls under the Clean Air Act - An Experience i

1980

TRANSPORTATION CONTROLS

provisions, precedent more clearly supports the federal
government's power to obtain compliance from a reluctant
state by conditioning certain federal expenditures on such
compliance. In fact, this means was pointedly suggested by
the Circuit Courts which denied EPA direct enforcement
authority."'e Ever since United States v. Butler.. was
decided in 1936, it has been established that the federal
spending power is not limited to use on behalf of other
enumerated powers, such as the commerce power; instead
it stands on its own bottom, limited only by the requirement in Article I, Section 8, that it be exercised to provide
for the "general welfare of the United States."
Although this "general welfare" standard apparently
does have some boundaries,"' they are at least wide enough
to impose no obstacle to federal spending on any activity
for which the 1977 Amendments authorize withholding of
funds. Indeed, quite recently in Buckley v. Valeo, °0 in reply
to the contention that public financing of presidential election campaigns was contrary to the general welfare, the
Court stated:
Appellants' "general welfare" contention erroneously treats the General Welfare Clause as a
limitation upon congressional power. It is rather
a grant of power, the scope of which is quite
expansive, particularly in view of the enlargement
of power by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
* * * It is for Congress to decide which expenditures
will promote the general welfare * * *. Any limitations upon the exercise of that granted power must
be found elsewhere in the Constitution.!"0
Attention is called, however, to the last sentence quoted
above. This must mean that Congress cannot structure its
spending in a manner which violates express constitutional
206. See Brown v. EPA, supra note 61, at 840; Maryland v. EPA, supra note
66 at 228; District of Columbia v. Train, supra note 67, at 993 n. 26.
207. United States v. Butler. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
208. Federal expenditures must be made "for the common benefit as distinguished
from some mere local purpose," United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.,
339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950); but the Court defers to rational congressional
judgment as to what is for the "common benefit," Helvering v. Davis,
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
249-50 (1978).
209. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
210. Id. at 90-91.
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restrictions on federal power - most particularly those
contained in the Bill of Rights. Certainly the Fifth Amendment would prohibit Congress' limiting financial assistance
to "members of the white race," and the First Amendment
would not allow it only to finance the election campaigns of
Democrats. Yet in Buckley itself the Court allowed Congress
largely to accomplish through conditional spending what
the First Amendment barred its doing directly: although it
held expenditure limitations on candidates for federal office
to be in violation of the First Amendment, 1 ' it sustained
such limitations when imposed as a condition on the acceptance by such candidates of public financing for their
campaigns."'
This holding can best be explained by the close relationship between the use of these funds and the permissable
governmental purpose of aiding candidates not adequately
supported by private sources. Any benefit to the impermissable purpose of controlling expenditures could be considered only incidential."' Thus, the conditional spending
approved in Buckley is unlike a situation in which such
funds are conditioned on the candidate's being a Democrat
where the only purpose served is constitutionally impermissable. If this requirement of a close relationship to a
permissable purpose is correct, it would make unconstitutional a cutoff of unrelated funds: for example, the termination of a candidate's federal research grant because of his
excessive campaign expenditures. There the connection between the designated use of the funds and permissable aid
to inadequately-financed campaigns would be anything but
close; instead the purpose served is clear - the unconstitutional discouragement of big campaign spending. In other
contexts such deprivation of unrelated funds is termed an
unconstitutional ."penalty" if the assistance is withheld to
"punish" the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right.
211. Id. at 39-59.
212. Id. at 57, n. 65; 99; 101; 107-09.
213. The author's confidence in this difficult analysis is aided by Professor
Tribe's apparent agreement. See TRIBE, supra note 208, at 806 n. 3.
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This is the reasoning employed in such cases as Shapiro
v. Thompson"' and Memorial Hospitalv. MaricopaCounty, " '
in which the court found durational residency requirements
for the receipt of public welfare benefits to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the exercise of the fundamental right to interstate travel. In Maher v. Roe2 . the
Court was called upon to distinguish these cases from the
one before it in which the state denied indigent women
medicaid benefits for abortions while making such benefits
available for the expenses of childbirth, arguably interfering
with the woman's fundamental right to decide whether 2'to
17
terminate her pregnancy. In a very significant footnote,
the Court pointed out that the instant case did not involve
a denial of general welfare benefits unrelated to the state's
legitimate interest in encouraging childbirth," 8 which would
be closely analogous to Shapiro and Maricopa County. Instead, as the Court explained, the case before it only involved
the state's refusal to pay for the abortion itself, which the
Court analogized to a state's refusal to pay for interstate
travel by an indigent - something which the Court obviously would find to present no constitutional problem.
The Court's reasoning in Maher, therefore, seems to be
the same as that used above to explain the Buckley decision:
while funds used in the exercise of a fundamental right
may be conditioned (and cut off) to further a legitimate
"general welfare" purpose, unrelated funds may not be
conditioned (or cut off) for the purpose of "penalizing"
the exercise of such right. Because the states, through their
police power, have essentially the same broad authority to
spend for the general welfare as Congress has, the constitutional analysis of the effect of their spending decisions on
fundamental rights should be the same as that applied to
federal spending. And such reasoning employed to define
the limits to conditional spending that affects fundamental
personal rights should also define the limits to federal
214.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

215.

Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).

216.
217.

Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Id. at 474 n. 8.

218.

Such an interest was found to be legitimate by the Court. Id. at 478.
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spending which affects the newly-rediscovered fundamental
states' rights.
A footnote in NLC itself expressly left open the possibility that funds could be withheld from essential state
functions of which the federal government disapproves."'
Indeed, the constitutionality of conditional spending per se
was a well-settled issue long before NLC was decided. 2
In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission,,"'
the Supreme Court had little difficulty with the state's
claim that federal highway funds could not be conditioned
on compliance with a provision in the Hatch Act prohibiting
political activity by state officials primarily employed in
activities financed by federal funds:
* * * [W]hile the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local
political activities as such of state officials, it does
have power to fix the terms upon which its money
allotments to states shall be disbursed.
* * * [T]he end sought by Congress through
the Hatch Act is better public service by requiring
those who administer funds for national needs to
abstain from active political partisanship. So even
though the action taken by Congress does have
effect upon certain activities within the state, it
has never been thought that such effect made the
federal act invalid. * * * The offer of benefits to a
state by the United States dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for
the general welfare, is not unusual. 2'
We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if
Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by
exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution
such as the Spending Power, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 n. 17.
220. As pointed out by Professor Stewart:
Moreover, if restricttions on expenditures of federal money per se were
to constitute an impermissible interference with state autonomy, all
federal conditional grants would be rendered unconstitutional. Such a
startling conclusion, which would invalidate at a stroke some $46
billion of federal spending and shatter the lynchpin of "cooperative
federalism," is hardly acceptable.
Stewart, supra note 189, at 1255.
221. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
222. Id. at 143-144.
Here, however, the funds to be cut off were in an amount equal to
two years' compensation for the offending state highway commissioner.
219.
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That NLC in fact made no change in this basic principle is
evident from the Court's action in North Carolina v. Califano. 223 There the district court had held that Congress
could condition some $50 million in federal health aid to the
state on its imposition of certain standards on health-care
facilities, even though the North Carolina Supreme Court
had found those conditions barred by the state constitution.
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed. At this point,
therefore, it seems clear that federal funds relied on by the
states for performance of essential governmental services
may be conditioned upon their use in a manner which
Congress deems consistent with "general welfare."
This does not, of course, resolve the constitutionality
of conditioning unrelated funds upon a state's following
federal directives concerning sovereign functions. Although
there exists no precedent specifically on point, the same
reasoning applied to fundamental personal rights should
apply here as well: a state's exercise of fundamental rights
derived from the Tenth Amendment cannot be "penalized"
by a cutoff of unrelated funds - that is, funds not themselves being used in a manner determined contrary to the
general welfare. To create an example from the NLC context: the federal government need not fund a police training
program paying below the minimum wage, but it may not
condition funds designated for crime laboratory equipment
upon paying minimum wages to the trainees." '
The limitations on federal assistance contained in
Sections 176 and 316 of the 1977 Air Act Amendments are
perfectly amenable to analysis according to the principles
here developed. These principles, however, only bar cutting
Thus the decision does no damage to a standard barring cutoff of unrelated funds.
223. North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978), affirming
445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. N.C. 1977).
224. Again the author takes some comfort in other commentators' apparent
agreement with this analysis. See TRIBE, supra note 208, at 315-16;
Stewart, supra note 189, at 1257-62.
That this is not a new idea without the dignity of earlier pronouncements is evidenced by Justice Stone's similar reasoning in his dissent in
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. at 78-88. Even without the use of this
precise analysis, however, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was struck
down by the Butler majority not because it fell outside the spending power
per se, but because it was found to coerce the state in an area then found
to be reserved for the states by the Tenth Amendment.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

55

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 1

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

off unrelated funds to achieve federal control over those
state governmental functions protected by the Tenth Amendment. If a state's implementation of a particular transportation control measure does not fall within the scope of the
Tenth Amendment protection, the federal government should
be permitted to "penalize" the states by cutting off unrelated
as well as related funds. It would indeed be anomolous to
disallow this if the federal government has the power to
invoke the more familiar civil and criminal penalties statutorily provided.225 Since the author has already dealt with
the protection afforded by the Tenth Amendment to various
transportation control measures, 26 the following analysis
of constitutional limitations to the Act's funding provisions
will bear exclusively upon use of those financial assistance
limitations to coerce performance of protected functions.
Also, for the sake of simplification, it will consider only
use of such funding sanctions to coerce submittal and implementation of VIM programs - the strategy most emphasized by EPA and most likely to run afoul of the Tenth
Amendment.
1. Federal highway funds
As discussed previously,227 Section 176(a) requires that
federal highway funds be withheld from any air quality
control region in which transportation controls are necessary for attainment if EPA finds that the state has not
submitted, or is not making reasonable efforts to submit,
an adequate revised plan. A wooden application of this
provision could present constitutional problems. An air
quality control region may include some areas which are
in attainment and some which are not.22 Certainly funds
used to construct highways in a region which facilitate
vehicle travel within, or commutertype travel into, an included nonattainment area may be sufficiently related to a
225.
226.
227.
228.

Clean Air Act § 113(a)-(c).
See notes 176-205 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 128-34 and accompanying text supra.
A nonattainment area is, for any air pollutant, an area determined by
EPA to exceed any national ambient air quality standard. Clean Air Act
§ 171(2). It may be but a portion of an air quality control region.
§ 107(d) (1).
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vehicle pollutant problem that their cutoff would be constitutional. In other situations, however, the constitutionality
could be more questionable.
If a proposed highway was to serve only a part of the
region with no nonattainment problems," ' a denial of funds
might not bear a reasonable relationship to nonattainment
in another part of the region - in which case, under the
foregoing analysis, it would be deemed an unconstitutional
penalty. Perhaps recognizing this problem, EPA's proposed
policies for applying Section 176 (a) would allow it to apply
the funding limitation to only a relevant portion of a
region."O Even within a nonattainment area, a particular
new highway might not contribute to the problem; conceivably it could help by reducing congestion. A blanket
ban for an area, therefore, could create constitutional problems in rare individual instances. If such a case arises,
however, a court should defer to any reasonable traffic
flow analysis made by EPA or the Department of Transportation and not attempt to resolve conflicting expert
testimony. If a state highway department has no authority
to prepare or submit a nonattainment plan, it might seem
"unfair" to restrict its funding; but a relationship, nevertheless, would normally exist between its "innocent" roadbuilding in an area and violation of vehicle pollutant standards there.2"' Of course, highway funding should not be
jeopardized if the only violation of an ambient standard is
for a non-vehicle pollutant such as S02; but this possibility
is avoided by the statutory requirement that transportation
controls be necessary for attainment before the highway
funding sanction is triggered. 32
229. Since Clean Air Act § 176 does not authorize disapproval of grants or
projects outside an offending region, no danger exists of the most obviously unconstitutional situation: a cutoff of funds for a highway in an
entirely separate part of the state where increased vehicle travel would
have no reatonable relationship to problems in the nonattainment area.
230. See notes 168-69 and accompanying text supra.
231. Perhaps sympathetic to this potential problem, EPA's proposed policies
would seem to allow it to withhold funds only from specific agencies
responsible for the failure to submit. See note 169 supra.
232. Another potential problem under this constitutional analysis is avoided
by that portion of CGean Air Act § 176(a) which excepts from the funding
limitations safety, mass transit, and transportation improvement projects
related to air quality improvement or maintenance. EPA's propo ed policies
on transportation funding liberally construe these terms. Sce 44 Fed.
Reg. at 33476 (1979).
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In general, the highway funding restrictions in Section
176 (a) seem narrow enough, and are amenable enough
to even more narrowing constructions, that, if EPA continues in the conservative spirit indicated by its proposed
policies, its action should withstand constitutional attack.
2. Air Act funding
More complex problems can arise from EPA's statutory
directive to withhold any grants authorized by the Air Act.
The mandate of Section 176(a), discussed above, applies to
Air Act funding as well as highway funding for cases in
which states fail to submit nonattainment plans containing
necessary transportation control measures. Section 176(b),
however, only directs EPA not to make any grants under
the Air Act in any area-" in which a designated state or
local agency is not implementing any requirement of an
approved or promulgated plan. Even though it might be
counterproductive to cut off Air Act administration funds
from even a poorly functioning state agency, those agencies
may be so dependent upon their federal funding that this
could be a very sizeable carrot to encourage state cooperation. " 4 It might also be a weapon that, if improperly applied,
could run into constitutional difficulties.
The structure of Section 176(b) is more susceptible
to a constitutional construction. If a state or local governmental agency in an area is not carrying out its duties
under an applicable plan, then it is certainly reasonable to
withhold any financial assistance until that agency performs
in a manner evidencing that the funds will be properly
applied. On the other hand, one agency should not be "penalized" - as the term has been used above - for the failures
The restriction in Clean Air Act § 176(b) is expressly confined to the
relevant "area," while § 176(a) speaks of air quality control regions.
However, for both highway and air funds EPA proposes to apply § 176(a)
only to the relevant portion of a region when appropriate. See notes 168-69,
230, and accompanying text supra. Neither § 176(a) or (b) allows withholding of funds from any part of the state outside an offending region
or area (as the case may be).
234. § 105 (a) (1) (B) of the Clean Air Act provides for federal funding of up
to three-fourths of the cost of establishing and three-fifths of the cost
of maintaining state and local air pollution control agencies. § 175 provides
100% federal funding to local officials for developing nonattainment
plan revisions. § 210 allows federal funding of up to two-thirds of the
cost to state agencies of developing and maintaining VIM programs.
233.
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of another agency. For example: if a state-level pollution
control agency has the responsibility to implement the VIM
segment of an approved plan for a particular nonattainment area, EPA could constitutionally withhold funds
otherwise available under Section 210 from that agency if
it fails to discharge this responsibility;235 but it could not
under these circumstances withhold money available to a
local agency under Section 105 for performance of duties
unrelated to VIM, especially if the local agency has no
authority to carry out the VIM program. The limitation
indicated in EPA's proposed policies for applying Section
176(a) suggests that it intends to keep its actions in this
context within constitutional bounds - by limiting its
withholding of funds to the specific agencies responsible
for any failures to comply. 3 '
Section 176(a) itself, however, presents greater constitutional difficulties. First, as discussed when considering highway funds, on its face it is not limited to nonattainment areas, but to entire air quality control regions. So,
again, this leaves open the possibility of withholding Air Act
funding in a clean air portion of a region from a local agency
with no jurisdiction to establish the necessary controls for
another area which is in nonattainment. The likelihood of
EPA's invoking such an unconstitutional "penalty," however,
seems to be lessened by its proposal to limit application 2of
37
Section 176 (a) to portions of an air quality control region.
Even in a single area entirely within the boundaries of a
single municipality, however, a situation could exist in which
a particular local agency program otherwise eligible for a
grant has no function related to the deficiency in a submitted
plan. In this situation, for EPA to withhold grant funding
from such a program might be unconstitutional under our
"relationship" principle-even if that agency is responsible
for the deficiency.
235. It is far less certain, under our analysis, that EPA could withhold funds
applied by the state agency to programs in the area unrelated to VIM for example, money authorized by Clean Air Act § 105 for stationary
source regulation.
236. 44 Fed. Reg. at 33474.
237. Id.
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Obviously the proper application of our "close relationship" standard for constitutionality will depend on the particular circumstances of each case. With so many critically
different situations possible, it would not be productive to
engage in more abstract or hypothetical analysis. The very
fact that individual circumstances are so important, however, is good reason for EPA to have maximum flexibility
176. So far its intentions seem to
in implementing Section 38
be in the right direction.
3. Sewage Plant Construction Grants
The limitations on grants for construction of sewage
treatment plants contained in Section 316(b) present the
greatest threat to the states. 2 9 Although proper construction of the terms of the statutes allows such vital grants to
be withheld only from plants proposed in a nonattainment
area,24 0 situations could still exist in which a new plant would
not contribute to the nonattainment problem-for example:
(1) a plant which merely replaces an existing one without
adding more capacity; (2) a plant not utilized by a stationary source (a "direct discharger") whose S02 emissions
cause the only nonattainment problem in the area; or (3) a
plant that will enable people to live in a part of the area
which will make them less dependent on vehicles. To withhold grants in such situations as these would run afoul of
the constitutional principle advocated by the author.
In the typical case, however, a new plant is for the purpose of accommodating surburban growth, with attendant
increase in commuting and, therefore, vehicle pollutants.
Under the "relationship" principle, it would be constitu238. For example, in its proposed policies on transportation funding EPA,
states, "the EPA Regional Administra'or has discretion to continue to
award grants available under the Clean Air Act to State and local air
quality control agencies if he finds such grants are necessary for immediate air quality benefits or development of SIP revisions." 44 Fed. Reg.
at 33476.
239. See notes 137-38 and accompanying text supra.
240. Although Clean Air Act § 316 also allows grants for construction of
plants in clean air areas to be withheld, properly construed the statute
only allows this to occur when the state does not have in effect or is not
carrying out a "PSD" plan required by Part C of the 1977 Amendments.
It should not be construed to allow withholding of grants for a clean air
area because of failures in a nonattainment area. To do so would be to
allow an uncon titutional application under the author's "relation- hip"
principle.
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tional for EPA to restrict grants for new sewage plants
which will increase treatment capacity in a nonattainment
area (1) when a state has not submitted a nonattainment
plan which accounts for any increase in emissions caused,
directly or indirectly, by the plant and included therein
whatever additional controls are necessary, or (2) when a
state is not carrying out such a plan, or (3) when the increase in capacity may reasonably be anticipated to cause
more emissions than accounted for in the plan. If a state
has not submitted a plan which accounts for any increase in
emissions to be caused by a new plan in a nonattainment
area, EPA should be able to withhold a construction grant.
Since the most likely result of not obtaining funds to construct a new treatment plant Would be a ban on new sewage
hook-ups,"4 the relationship between such prevention of
growth and the control of vehicle pollution, in the usual
case, would be sufficiently close to make it constitutional.
Similarly, if an approved plan is not being carried out
so as to make "reasonable further progress" for vehicle pollutants, or if a new plant would cause such progress to be
destroyed, EPA should be able at least to condition the grant
to allow only hook-ups sufficient to serve the existing population. Again, the relationship between new residential growth
and worsening of the vehicle pollution problem will usually
be close enough to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Fortunately, EPA's notice of interim policy indicates that it is
structuring its discretionary approval power under Section
316 (b) in a manner consistent with this analysis.242
4. Federal Action Not Conforming To An Applicable Plan
As mentioned earlier,2 43 Section 176 (c) prohibits any
federal action, support, licensing, or approval furthering any
activity which does not conform to a plan after it has been
approved or promulgated. Under either the commerce power
or the spending power (as the case may be), application of
this mandate should present no constitutional problem so
241. See note 137 8upra.
242. See EPA notice of interim policy on sewage plant construction, 44 Fed.
Reg. 38575 (1979).
243. See notes 135-36 and accompanying text supra.
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long as only conformity by the particular proposed source
is required. The typical state-owned sources which require
federal permits--e.g., power plants, incinerators, landfills,
etc.-do not involve performance of NLC-type fundamental
governmental functions. 44 Even to the extent that a state
activity requiring federal approval-say, creation of a flood
plain restricting development-does involve integral sovereign functions, any constitutional requirement of a close relationship, whether to a legitimate spending or commerce
clause purpose, would be satisfied. If, however, the language
of Section 176 (c) were to be stretched to require federal disapproval of any project or activity whenever it would add
to a nonattainment problem not being met to EPA's satisfaction by the state, constitutional "relationship" problems
might arise. To the extent anything other than federal
funding is involved, analysis of this difficult issue is subsumed in essence by the discussion which follows.
C. Prohibition of New Stationary Sources
Problems separate from those raised by funding limitations, but which lead to surprisingly similar constitutional
analysis, arise from the new statutory provisions prohibiting
the construction or modification 4 of major stationary
sources in any nonattainment area for which24 a6 state fails to
submit or implement a nonattainment plan.
Most basically, the federal government possesses ample
authority under the commerce clause to regulate major
sources of air pollution, to the complete pre-emption of the
states, anywhere in the country.4 If, consistent with statutory language and EPA's interpretation,24 permitting bans
are restricted to nonattainment areas where health-based
ambient standards are not being met for those pollutants
emitted by the proposed major sources, the bans will fall
well within the commerce power. Even though such con244. See notes 180-90 and accompanying text supra.
245. Henceforth, for simplification, reference will be made
of new major stationary sources ("major sources")
"modifications," on the assumption that the same
either instance - as they should.
246. See discussion in notes 122-27 and accompanying text
247. See note 9 supra.
248. See notes 164-66 and accompanying text supra.
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struction prohibitions, if imposed because of a state's failure to submit an adequate plan, might well coerce the state
to submit a plan containing such fundamental governmental
functions as VIM, the coercive effect should be deemed incidental to the legitimate federal purpose of controlling air
pollution-until EPA has time to promulgate a substitute
plan.
On the other hand, if EPA were to apply a permitting
ban to major sources which would have no effect on concentration of pollutants that exceed the ambient standards, 4 '
its action would merit much closer scrutiny. Indeed, to the
extent such a ban were imposed only to coerce state submittal
of a plan committing the state to governmental functions, it
By
should be treated as an unconstitutional "penalty."
principles analogous to those applied to conditional spending, EPA should be required to justify its action as reasonably related to a purpose legitimate under the commerce
power. A sole purpose of coercing state governmental functions would not be legitimate under NLC. The reasonableness of its direct"' relationship to pollution control is a more
difficult issue. Because, however, EPA would not be imposing such bans on major sources in states which had submitted and were implementing all necessary plans, it would
be hard-pressed to convincingly argue that its action was reasonably related to a pollution-control purpose. Perhaps such
total deference as is accorded congressional decisions in business regulation cases. 5 ' would carry the day for EPA. The
author does not believe, however, that such judicial abdication
should be used where, as here, fundamental rights are substantially affected. Minimal scrutiny in this situation would
indicate that EPA's means were reasonably related only to
the impermissible purpose of coercing state governmental
functions. 2
249. Either because the proposed sources are to be located so far away from
any nonattainment area or because they emit only pollutants for which
affected areas are in attainment.
250. That is, not through the impermissible route of coercing state regulation.
251. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
252. A question which is even more bothersome, because of the apparent
answer, is whether major sources not affecting any nonattainment area
might be forced to bear the brunt of EPA's efforts to pursuade the state
to submit or implement controls requiring only the performance of duties
not treated as fundamental under the Tenth Amendment. More creative
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Even in the case of major sources proposed for construction within nonattainment areas which would emit pollutants for which concentrations already exceed the ambient
standards, EPA should not be able to simply maintain a permitting ban in effect until a state relents and submits a qualifying plan. Constitutional analysis similar to that used
above could be employed: this means would be "reasonably" '
related only to the impermissible purpose of coercing state
governmental functions. Such a holding, however, would
require a court to view EPA's unwillingness to promulgate
a true substitute regulatory plan as "unreasonable." Even
a court which would be persuaded by the reasoning applied
above to distant sources, however, might not be inclined to
take this step. Fortunately, if the Act is obeyed, no court
will be placed in this position. As pointed out earlier,25 '
Section 110 (c) requires EPA to prepare a substitute plan.
Once this is done, however, the Act 5 seems to allow EPA to
impose (or continue) a permitting ban if the state fails or
refuses to carry it out.
Thus a familiar and difficult question is again raised:
does the Constitution allow EPA to maintain a permitting
ban in effect so long as a state refuses to implement a plan
which requires it to perform such governmental functions
as VIM. If a court is unavoidably faced with this question,
its answer should be "no". EPA would have too many other
regulatory methods at its disposal-including offsets-for
a permanent permitting ban seriously to be considered a
reasonable means of controlling pollution. Its only reasonable relationship to pollution control would be through the indirect-and constitutionally impermissible -route of coercing state governmental action. This same difficult reasoning also should be applied to strike down any attempt by
EPA to invoke a permitting ban256 to force a state to carry

253.
254.
255.
256.

thought than the author can muster would be required to save the sources
from the traditional reasonable relationship/permissible purpose analysis.
Fortunately the situation is purely hypothetical, since neither the Act
nor EPA's interpretation allows this.
Applying anything more than complete deference.
See notes 139-41 and accompanying text supra.
Clean Air Act § 113(a) (5).
In lieu of promulgating and implementing a substitute plan. An interim
ban applied only while EPA promulgates the substitute should be upheld.
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out governmental functions contained in a state-submitted
plan not binding under state law."'T
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing constitutional analysis leaves the federal
government with ample leverage over states who are resistant to the principles of cooperative federalism. Only if
it becomes completely insensitive to state sovereignty and
takes up a big stick to "penalize" states-by direct enforcement or by denial of unrelated funds or permits-will it cross
the constitutional line. All indications are that Congress
is fully capable of responding to relieve such unjustifiable
federal pressure before it builds to that point, 58 and that
federal agencies themselves may become sufficiently sensitized to the constitutional and political limits of their powers
that they stop short of construing their authority in ways
that intrude abusively on states' rights. 5 ' Only when these
political checks fail to function should a court have to give
the government a lesson in federalism principles. If a court
is forced to do so, however, the author hopes that it will
employ a comprehensive model such as here constructed
rather than reacting with no more than ringing declarations
of the sort made in National League of Cities v. Usery.

257. See notes 199-205 and accompanying text supra.
258. Consider how Congress severely limited indirect source review and parking
controls after they attracted strong local hostility and how in the 1977
Amendments it relaxed statutory deadlines and provided relief, such as
through delayed compliance orders, from requirements resisted by state
and industry officials.
259. Consider EPA's recent interpretations of its powers to invoke sanctions
discussed in text accompanying notes 146-75 supra.
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